Tag Archives: Saudi Arabia

Caught up in Iraq

Caught up in Iraq

Can Saudi Arabia stop Iran in Iraq, asks Salah Nasrawi

“Iran is taking over Iraq,” Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal decried last week while slamming Iran’s “hegemonistic tendencies in the region.”  “We see Iran involved in Syria and Lebanon and Yemen and Iraq and God knows where. This must stop if Iran is to be part of the solution of the region and not part of the problem.”

The blunt words by the usually reserved Saudi top diplomat made waves with its most scathing criticism for Iran’s support to Iraq‘s Shia-led government and raised a host of difficult questions about the kingdom’s strategy in dealing with the region’s simmering crises.

Prince Saud broke no new ground on Saudi doctrine on Iraq. Since the overthrow of the Sunni-dominated Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 2003 US-led war Saudi Arabia has viewed Iraq as falling under Iran’s influence and remained reluctant to establish full diplomatic and political ties with the Shia-led government in Baghdad.

But Prince Saud strongly-worded remarks reflect the Sunni Arab powerhouse’s anxiety over Shia Persian Iran’s close and increasing involvement in the sectarian-divided and war-torn country.

Since the stunning territorial victory of the militants in June and their seizure of nearly one third of Iraq’s territories, Iran has escalated its role in Iraq, especially in building the Shia militias. It has mobilised its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to build a massive and effective Iraqi Shia paramilitary force through funding, training and weapon supplies.

Iranian commanders are also spearheading the Iraqi attacks on the IS-held towns, providing tactical expertise to Iraqis. Major-General Qassim Soleimani, commander of the elite Quds Force, the IGRC’s special operations arm, is directly overseeing the offensives against IS.

Echoing fear of sectarian reprisals during operations to drive IS’s militants out of Sunni towns, Prince Saud had referred to the ongoing offensive in the Sunni-populated Tikrit as an example of the overt Iranian involvement in Iraq.

A combination of some 30,000 Iraqi security forces and the Shia Popular Mobilisation Units launched an offensive to retake Tikrit from the terror group this week. Tikrit, the hometown of former President Saddam Hussein, is viewed as a key foothold for a widely expected assault on Mosul, the IS’s self-declared capital.

Members of Iran-backed Shia militias who are part of the Popular Mobilisation Units have been accused of abuses against civilians in areas Iraqi forces have retaken from Islamic State. Human rights groups also are fearful the campaign in Tikrit could lead to atrocities.

Perhaps the most worrying sign to Saudi Arabia about Iran’s influence in Iraq remains rhetoric by Iranian leaders which reflect Tehran’s ambitions in Iraq.

On Sunday, Ali Younesi, a senior advisor to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani boasted that Iraq has already become part of Iran.

“Iran today has become an empire as it was throughout history and its capital now is Baghdad in Iraq, which is the center of our civilization and our culture and identity today as it was in the past.”

Right now Iran is only helping Iraqis in battling IS. Still, Saudi leaders are wondering how much influence will Iran have in Iraq if the militants are evicted from all of the country and if this cozy relationship between the two countries is anything to be concerned about.

In short, Saudi Arabia believes that by increasing its control over Shia communities in Iraq and the region and through the persistent expansion of its influence, Iran is pursuing a power politics of the national interest. This has created enormous problems to Saudi Arabia which finds its leadership role in the Muslim Sunni world is being challenged by Iran.

In order to confront Iran, Saudi Arabia has tried a four-pronged approach to influence events in Iraq, without much success.

First, Saudi Arabia believes that empowerment of Iraqi Sunni Arabs is key to not only to put an end to their exclusion following Saddam’s ouster but also to resist Iranian influence in Iraq.

Saudi Arabia has largely relied on its traditional checkbook diplomacy to cement close connections with Iraqi Sunni tribes and political and religious figures to bolster their capacity politically and financially.

However, despite its generous support no viable and credible Iraqi Sunni leadership has emerged. Until the Sunni minority develops a united voice and platform to engage with Shia majority, Saudi Arabia will find it difficult to effectively push for meaningful change in Iranian pro-Shia policy in the country.

Moreover, accusations that Saudi Arabia’s policy somehow plays a role in supporting jihadi-style extremism has undermined the kingdom’s ability in advancing the Iraqi Sunni’s interests.

Second, Riyadh had resorted to oil as a weapon to have more latitude over Iran and the Shia-led government in Iraq. As the world’s largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia can threaten the Iranian and Iraqi economies if it chooses to keep production high and prices low.

One way to do that is to continue its hands-off policy toward falling oil prices to screw its arch enemies in the region, the Iranians and the Iraqi Shia government.

But while the lower oil prices have harmed Iran’s and Iraq’s economic short term prospects their governments have worked hard to repair the damage caused by falling revenues.

Still, there is no doubt that Iran will continue military and political backing of its Iraqi Shia allies in the confrontation with IS even if it has to grapple with economic difficulties caused by oil prices’ slump.

Indeed, Tehran is showing no signs of battle fatigue and it is probably ahead of the game in clash with Saudi Arabia over other regional disputes, such as Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

Third, Saudi Arabia has been trying to block a possible rapprochement between Iran and the United States following a potential nuclear deal with Iran. Knowing that the deal is neither directly nor exclusively about the nuclear issue Riyadh has been seeking assurance from Washington that there will be no “grand bargain” with Iran.

Here again Riyadh’s choices seems to be limited. Although the Obama administration tried to ease the kingdom’s concerns about a “comprehensive” deal with Iran, a nuclear agreement now seems more likely.

The United States also does not seem to see to eye to eye with Saudi Arabia about Iran’s role in Iraq. Last week top US general Martin Dempsey said Iran’s involvement in the fight against IS in Iraq could be “a positive step”, as long as the situation does not descend into sectarianism.

The military chief also claimed that almost two thirds of the 30,000 offensive were Iranian-backed militiamen, meaning that without Iranian assistance and Soleimani’s guidance, the offensive on IS-held towns may not have been possible.

Finally, Saudi Arabia has been trying to build a broad regional Sunni bloc to curtail Iran’s and Shia’s rising influence. A great deal of this Saudi effort is to engage largely Sunni-populated Turkey in shaping this bipolar regional sectarian system.

Nevertheless, such an alliance will have vast implications on the regional balance of power and has the potential to reshape relationships throughout the Middle East. Turkey which has succeeded in staying away from regional sectarian polarization may find it counterproductive to be part of a Sunni bloc against its powerful eastern neighbour and the entire Shia world.

As many Turkish commentators wrote following a visit by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Riyadh last month an anti-Iran or anti-Shia front will only escalate sectarian tensions in the region and has no benefit for Turkey and any other country.

In addition, such an alliance will put Ankara’s key strategic interests such the Kurdish issue and its relations with its vast Allawite minority at risks.

Any assessment of Iran’s role in Iraq since Saddam’s downfall will show that Tehran has exploited Iraq’s 12 year old conflict to weaken the country and create outcomes that are likely to give it leverage over its Sunni neighbors and deprive them of strategic advantages and create new sources of threat.

Yet, Saudi Arabia and other Iraq’s Sunni neighbours have equally failed to come up with a viable plan to stop Iraq’s ethno sectarian conflict staying on a steady boil to threaten regional stability.

Unfortunately, the prospect of sectarian rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is expected to escalate, with sources of tension evident across the region. Nowhere this competition for power and influence is more evident than in Iraq which is expected to bear most of its devastating consequences.

This article first published in Al Ahram Weekly on March 12, 2015

In quest of an Arab force

In quest of an Arab force

Egypt is pressing ahead with proposals for a joint Arab force to counter the threat of terrorism, writes Salah Nasrawi

Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi flew to Riyadh this week to discuss with Saudi King Salman his proposals for a joint Arab force to combat terrorism as the Middle East continues to be overtaken by political unrest.

Thus far there have been no signs that Salman, who succeeded his half-brother King Abdullah, a staunch supporter of Al-Sisi, earlier this year, has endorsed the proposals, raising questions about the new monarch’s strategy to manage regional turmoil.

Ahead of his visit, Al-Sisi told two leading Saudi media outlets that he hoped Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf countries will join the military alliance, which he described as badly needed to safeguard the region’s security and stability.

“We have the capacity to form a credible force and [send] a strong message to potential adversaries that they cannot threaten us if we remain united, and terrorists cannot hurt us unless we stay disunited,” Al-Sisi told Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper in an interview.

“We are presenting this proposal to our brothers, and there is an opportunity to start a discussion on how to achieve the security and stability of our countries,” Al-Sisi told the Al-Arabiya television network in another interview

While Jordan’s King Abdullah has supported the proposals, Al-Sisi said, he hopes that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates will join in.

Al-Sisi has become increasingly vocal about the need for Arab military cooperation after Islamist radicals in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and in neighbouring Libya declared their allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) terror group, which has seized large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria.

He has urged Arab countries to form a unified force to fight terrorism in the region after Egyptian air strikes last month targeted IS jihadists in the Libyan coastal city of Derna in retaliation for the slaughter of 21 Egyptian Christians.

The proposals are expected to top the agenda of an Arab League summit in Sharm El-Sheikh later this month. Arab League Chief Nabil Al-Arabi said the summit, which will be headed by Al-Sisi, will discuss the “re-activation” of the Arab Defence and Economic Pact to confront jihadist terrorism and other security threats.

Under the 1950 agreement setting up the Economic Pact, the 22 League members consider “any attack against one of them as an attack on all” and allows them to use “all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and peace.”

Ideas to create a joint force have been floated before, but a pan-Arab military alliance has always proved difficult to achieve as security strategies remain largely a national issue for Arab governments.

At an Arab summit in Riyadh in 2007, leaders discussed an Egyptian proposal to adopt “a comprehensive concept for pan-Arab security.” The proposal was aimed at creating a “mechanism” to resolve regional conflicts “without foreign intervention.”

A year earlier at an Arab summit in Khartoum, Arab leaders made plans to set up an Arab Peace and Security Council that would be tasked with settling inter-Arab disputes, including the use of peacekeeping forces in hotspots.

The plan has never been implemented due in part to squabbles over sovereignty and national security and defence policies.

Separately, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has already set up the Gulf Shield Defence Force. The six-member council has also decided to create both a joint naval force and a common counter-terrorist body.

So far, these and other security-related agreements have largely proved ineffective or have remained unenforced.

But security in the Arab world has become a key concern in the current transformations that have swept across much of the Arab world after a series of popular uprisings in 2011 against some of the region’s worst autocratic regimes.

Political turmoil and the failure of state rebuilding that followed have given rise to chaos, violence and terrorism, prompting regional governments to search for better security frameworks.

Though A-Sisi has firmly and clearly stated the goals behind the proposals, Egyptian officials have disclosed few details about the envisioned military alliance.

On 27 February, the London-based newspaper Al-Hayat quoted a “well-informed” Egyptian official as saying the proposed force would be largely Egyptian with “symbolic participation from other countries.”

“The troops will be based in Cairo but will have units that depend mostly on commandos and rapid deployment forces with a joint command,” the official was quoted as saying.

The joint operational command will draw up plans, supervise training and prepare the force to be deployed in hotspots, he said.

Countries with armies will provide troops, while other partners will provide logistic support, the official said.

It is also not clear how the potential partners in the Egyptian-proposed alliance will shift from unilateral anti-terrorism approaches to a multilateral policy. While most Arab governments agree on the need to combat terrorism, they do not see eye to eye on how to eliminate its threats.

Saudi officials have not publicly reacted to Al-Sisi’s proposals or to the report in Al-Hayat. Following Al-Sisi’s talks with King Salman, the official Saudi Press Agency reported only that the two leaders had “reviewed regional and world developments.”

But several Saudi commentators closely connected to the royal family and usually reflecting official Saudi views have been outspoken about evidence of differing Egyptian and Saudi priorities over regional security issues.

A key disagreement revealed by these writers concerns the kingdom’s preference for an alliance that brings together Egypt and the rest of the Sunni Arab countries with Turkey to confront Iran and its regional Shia proxies.

Writing in the Saudi-owned Al-Hayat newspaper on the same day Al-Sisi visited Riyadh, prominent Saudi columnist Khaled Al-Dukheil said the kingdom is interested in Egypt joining a Saudi-Turkish-led alliance.

“Under current circumstances, this triangle is a strategic necessity that will restore some of the balance after the fall of Iraq and Syria. In addition, it will form a defence against the destructive Iranian role,” he wrote.

“Turkey is a pillar of this region,” he added. “Will Egypt be moving, even a bit, in the direction started by Saudi Arabia?” Al-Dukheil asked.

Another Saudi writer, Jamal Khashoggi, questioned Egypt’s strategy against jihadists in Libya and warned Cairo against getting “carried away” by its air strikes on Derna.

“Those who love Egypt should prevent it from falling into the trap of Da’esh and going into a war in Libya,” he wrote in Al-Hayat, using IS’s Arabic acronym.

In a Twitter posting, Khashoggi even denied earlier reports that Egypt had already sent troops to the Saudi-Yemeni border to help the kingdom secure the restive area, saying that the Saudis can defend themselves.

These views underscore sharp differences between Cairo and Riyadh in approaching regional security problems. While Egypt feels threatened by the jihadists and believes that Turkey’s support for the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood fuels unrest, Saudi Arabia seems to give priority to wooing Turkey in its efforts to confront Iran and its Shia allies.

The arguments of the Saudi writers show another fundamental difference between Cairo and Riyadh over the validity of the US-led international coalition fighting IS in Iraq and Syria.

Cairo has repeatedly talked about double standards in the way the coalition is dealing with IS in Iraq and Syria militarily, while insisting on a political solution for the crisis in Libya.

Though Egypt has backed the alliance, it has not taken part in the coalition’s air strikes in Syria. Unlike Saudi Arabia, which wants to oust Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, Egypt calls for a political solution to the crisis in Syria.

Speculation that the Obama administration is trying to forge a grand Middle East peace settlement with Iran through its nuclear negotiations have sent ripples of alarm through Riyadh and other Gulf capitals.

Saudi Arabia, which has long relied on US protection, seems still to be hoping that the international coalition will be a positive force in curtailing Iranian influence.

To be sure, the differences over how to confront the growing threat of terrorism and other security challenges paint a grim picture of the Arab world. Much of it is in a mess, with the instability worsening.

Nevertheless, the region’s leaders remain as divided as ever, even as they admit that they face an existential threat as never before since the modern Arab states came into being some one hundred years ago.

This article appeared first in Al Ahram Weekly on March 5, 2015

After Abdullah

After Abdullah

King Abdullah’s successor has pledged to make ‘continuity’ in the oil-rich kingdom a priority,  writes Salah Nasrawi

“I beg the Almighty God to help me to serve you and to bestow security and stability on our country and nation and to protect them from any harm and evil,” declared Saudi Arabia’s new monarch, King Salman bin Abdel-Aziz, in his first address to his people following his accession to the throne of the world’s largest oil exporter.

In the few hours before the new king received the crown and made his televised inauguration speech, Salman, 80, hurried to put Saudi Arabia’s royal house in order by swiftly defining the line of succession following the death of his half-brother King Abdullah, 91, on Friday.

While the move suggested that Salman was trying to show that he is in charge, it reflected the growing anxiety about the kingdom’s biggest dynastic challenge since it was established by Abdullah and Salman’s father, Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud, in 1932.

By upholding a decision by Abdullah to name his youngest half-brother Mugrin, 69, as crown prince and by appointing nephew Mohamed bin Nayef, 55, as deputy crown prince, Salman has tried to quell speculation about internal power struggles within the royal circle.

Abdullah named Mugrin as Salman’s successor in 2013, in what was an unprecedented move in Saudi leadership turnover. Under Saudi law, the Allegiance Council — a committee made up of of the most senior Al-Saud princes, set up by Abdullah in 2006 — is in charge of appointing the future king and ensuring a smooth succession.

Still, it was the designation of Mohamed as heir to the heir apparent that raised more eyebrows and shifted the focus to internal palace rifts in Riyadh’s precarious power transfer and its implications for both the kingdom and the region.

Speculation was high that the appointment of Mugrin was designed to pave the way for Abdullah’s eldest son, Prince Mitab, to become a crown prince after Mugrin. Abdullah was believed to have been grooming Mitab and his appointment to minister of the National Guard in 2013, making him a member of the cabinet, was meant to bring him closer to the succession.

Abdullah also named another one of his sons a deputy foreign minister, and two other sons as provincial governors of the capital Riyadh and the holy city of Mecca respectively, a move seen as an attempt to enable his clan to consolidate its grip on power after his death.

Abdullah’s promotion of his sons was also seen as part of a dynamic to ensure transition to suitable candidates in the next generation of Al-Saud and the kingdom’s future political evolution. Its aim, experts argue, was to avoid a succession struggle among dozens, and probably hundreds, of aspirants to the throne among Abdel-Aziz’s grandsons and great-grandsons.

But even with a smooth succession after Abdullah, Saudi Arabia’s transition remains contentious, with bloggers and commentators casting doubt over a long-term royal family accord. Most concentrated on the generational problem of succession confronting Saudi Arabia as the prolonged hold of Abdul Aziz’s sons comes to an end.

Some influential royal family members, like Prince Al-Walid bin Talal, an Abdul-Aziz grandson, have already shown signs of dissent. On 23 January, the multi-millionaire prince and business tycoon tweeted: “I have made my allegiance to father Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and father Mugrin bin Abdel-Aziz and congratulated my brother Mohamed bin Nayef.”

With all the potential discord that could follow the transition to the second generation of Al-Saud, King Abdullah’s successors are expected to face daunting challenges at home.

Among their biggest tasks, analysts say, are determining when and whether the kingdom will introduce political, economic and social reforms. For years, Saudis have been urging their government to initiate change, including opening opportunities for political participation.

Liberal-minded reformers have been demanding reform of the political system to initiate a constitutional monarchy and establish an elected parliament, instead of the consultative 120-member appointed Shura Council.

Saudis hope Abdullah’s successors will be able to solve these and other concerns, such as human rights issues and the role of the conservative religious establishment, and relinquish the long-held view that stability is the guarantor of security and peace for the kingdom.

Today, among the key challenges the kingdom faces is the fall in oil revenues that form the bulwark of its state budget. A prospected deficit of $39 billion in this year’s budget has forced the government to cut spending.

Though the government has said the deficit will be covered by its huge foreign reserves, the revenue plunge will force Saudi Arabia to cut back on salaries, wages and allowances, which make up about half of budgeted expenditures.

Externally, with the Middle East and the Arab Gulf region in turmoil, Abdullah’s successors will find their country at the centre of enormous regional conflicts. They will be challenged by a whole range of geopolitical developments.

One of Saudi Arabia’s biggest headaches is Persian-Shia Iran. With its ambitious nuclear programme, its patronage of Shia communities and spreading influence, Iran is emerging as a regional superpower in a clash with Arab-Sunni powerhouse Saudi Arabia.

With a substantial Shia minority in the Saudi eastern province and on the southern border with Yemen, the new leadership will remain jittery about the effect of Iran’s regional rise as an emerging Shia power on Saudi Arabia’s Shia community.

Also, fear that Washington may reach a détente with Tehran following an agreement over its nuclear programme has created a rift between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Inevitably, the new leadership in Riyadh has to deal with many Middle East crises, which have so far left the Saudi regional power off-balance, largely because of their overwhelming nature and the new regional order they have launched.

In Yemen, Abdullah’s successors are facing an escalating disaster as Shia Houthis assume control. With a civil war looming large in the country, Saudi Arabia’s southern neighbour is turning into a thorn in its side.

In Iraq and Syria, the kingdom also faces difficult dilemmas. Islamic State (IS) militants are digging their feet into both countries close to northern borders, despite the war waged by the US-led international coalition to degrade the group.

Neighbouring Bahrain, dependent on generous Saudi aid and security assistance, is facing a relentless Shia uprising. In Egypt, Saudi Arabia’s vehement support for President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi’s political and economic programme remains vital to the region’s security and peace.

Despite good relations with other partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council, Riyadh’s new rulers will face a daunting challenge from Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which are either showing independent foreign policy tendencies or increasing their regional power at Saudi Arabia’s expense.

Saudi Arabia’s political system has demonstrated a surprising resilience and stability in the past, but with many of its neighbours on fire, the country seems in need of more than simply the prayers of its new monarch to maintain its stability.

This article appeared first in Al-Ahram Weekly on Jan 29, 2015