Tag Archives: Iraq

Iraq-weapons

The dilemma of arming Iraq

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The dilemma of arming Iraq

Iraq depends on imported arms for its defence and in the fight against Islamic State, but its purchasing plans have been in trouble, writes Salah Nasrawi

The celebrations at the Balad Airbase in north Baghdad on 13 July to mark the arrival of four F-16 jets that Iraq had bought from the United States spoke volumes about Iraq’s arms acquisition programme, as the country remains gridlocked in the war against Islamic State (IS) militants, communal tensions and growing regional turmoil.

While the Iraqi security forces are in dire need of advanced weapons to fight the IS terror group and face up to increasing threats from neighbours, the government has been apparently helplessly caught in a trap of arms sales’ restrictions, foreign policy restraints, local sectarian struggles, and severe budget shortages.

Corruption and inefficiency in the security forces are well-known additional problems for Iraq’s arms supplies. When IS militants seized large swathes of the country last year, the army abandoned huge amounts of military vehicles and weapons. Large quantities of equipment were also lost to IS when the jihadists captured Ramadi in May.

The dilemma of arming Iraq is expected to undermine plans to drive back IS and in the long run to block efforts to restore stability to the war-torn nation and stop its neighbours from interfering in the country’s internal affairs.

The case of the F-16 jets is just one example of how Iraq has been unable to build a defence procurement programme appropriate to its security needs some 12 years after Washington dissolved the Iraqi army after the US-led invasion of the country.

Baghdad ordered 36 of the $65 million Lockheed Martin planes in 2011, but deliveries were delayed several times despite Iraq’s repeated requests to speed up the transfer to boost its ability to defend its airspace and borders.

The decision to send four F-16 warplanes was made only after Iraq threatened to cancel the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) it signed with the United States in 2008 which obliges Washington to help Iraq enhance its ability “to deter all threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity.”

More crippling hurdles surfaced shortly after the Iraqi air force showed off the first delivery at the Balad Airbase, when Kurdish officials revealed that the deal had come with strings attached and that it did not give the Baghdad government free rein to operate the planes.

A media outlet close to Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani’s ruling party said this week that the Kurds should have a say on how the planes would be operated. It claimed that the US had made it clear to Baghdad that it could not operate the jets in combat missions over Iraqi towns and cities.

“The jets are ready to use, but they will not be used against IS for the time being,” Rudaw quoted a Kurdish MP as saying. He said that “no Iraqi F-16 combat missions are allowed without Kurdish pilots.”

Rudaw quoted another Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) official as raising concerns that the newly acquired jets could be used to attack the Kurds in the event of a Baghdad-Kurdish conflict. Neither Baghdad nor Washington has reacted to these reports.

Like the Kurds, Israel and Iraq’s Arab neighbours have put pressure on Washington not to deliver the planes. As a result, the jets were downgraded to the F-16IQ Block 52 type that have lesser capabilities than the more advanced F-16C/D Block 52 base systems which many other Middle Eastern nations have.

For example, the jets to be shipped to Iraq will not have sophisticated air-to-ground weapons like GPS-guided JDAMs, or advanced air-to-air missiles, and this has been designed to alleviate Israel’s and the country’s Arab neighbours’ fears.

Such revelations have increased doubts that the jets can provide Iraq with an air-defence force that can deal with threats from its neighbours having more advanced air forces, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, or have at least some of the equipment required to handle serious threats.

Iraq is now believed to have some 137 military aircraft, down from the some 950 planes shortly before the 1991 Gulf War that dislodged former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s troops from Kuwait. Iraq’s current fleet consists mostly of transport and training planes, with only about 15 Russian-made Su-24 Sukhoi bombers in its arsenal.

On 6 July, a Sukhoi dropped a bomb accidently on a Baghdad neighbourhood, killing at least eight people and wounding others. The Iraqi air force said the jet, returning from a bombing raid against IS militants, had experienced a “technical problem” that had caused the bomb to fall.

Iraq has been relying heavily on US-led coalition warplanes to carry out airstrikes against IS targets. There have also been reports of Iran’s air force attacking IS targets in Iraq after the jihadi group captured the Iraqi city of Mosul in summer 2014.

Nevertheless, the current dilemma is not only about planes. Iraq has also complained of receiving downgraded or overused weapons coming from US army stockpiles. Other complaints include severe political conditions attached to the deals and overpricing.

The US newspaper US News & World Report reported last week that Baghdad had accepted only 300 of the some 3,000 pieces of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected combat trucks, or MRAPs, that the US had offered to provide it with.

The MRAPs were part of a delivery of vehicles that was made up largely of equipment withdrawn from Afghanistan and stockpiled in Kuwait. It is not clear why the US has been reluctant to provide Iraq with new types of trucks.

To show how serious the problem is, Iraq has signed some US$15 billion worth of arms orders with the United States, but many of them still need to receive the green light from government agencies and be approved by Congress.

In response to these hurdles, Iraq has sought to diversify the sources of its imports of weapons and technology and reduce its dependence on the United States. By inviting more players, such as Russia, China and the Czech Republic, to the table, Iraq hopes to dissuade Washington from exercising a monopoly over Iraq or of trying to blackmail it.

Last week, Iraqi defence minister Khalid Obaidi travelled to Moscow to sign a new deal with the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), the country’s biggest arms supplier.

Neither Baghdad nor Moscow revealed details about the deal, but FSMTC head Alexander Fomin told Russian media that Moscow was committed to helping Iraq strengthen its military capabilities in the light of current terror threats.

Moscow and Baghdad have also been expanding their military cooperation. In 2012, the Baghdad government signed a deal with Russia’s Rosoboronexport that has been variously estimated at US$4.2 to US$5 billion to provide Iraq with Mi-35 and Mi-28NE attack helicopters plus mobile SA-22 Pantsir low-level air-defence systems.

Russian officials, including president Vladimir Putin, have said that Moscow is ready to supply weapons to Iraq to aid the fight against the militants. The Russian-made helicopters have been extensively used to fight, seize and defend land retaken from IS.

Since IS advances last year, there have been reports that many other countries have sent weapons, ammunition and equipment to tackle the militants’ push, but the claims of the arms shipments appear to have been exaggerated.

The situation, however, remains dire, with evident serious weaknesses in the Iraqi security forces and a lack of the necessary equipment to defeat IS or to defend Iraq against regional threats.

Undoubtedly, the Iraqi government and military command bear primary responsibility for the mismanagement of the country’s armaments programme, largely due to their failure to rebuild an efficient Iraqi army.

Incompetence and corruption have played a large part in worsening this problem despite an annual military expenditure of some 25 per cent of the country’s gross national product (GNP) since post-Saddam Iraq had its first elected government in 2006.

The country’s economic crisis due to the sharp fall in oil prices and the subsequent shortage of funding is expected to hit the armaments programme hard and with it the Iraqi security forces’ performance in the war against IS.

However, by relinquishing their responsibility to arm the Iraqi security forces the world, and in particular the United States, is walking away from Iraq, allowing the war against IS to drag on and putting time on the IS side.

Until they rethink their overall strategy in fighting IS, including a review of their modest weapons supplies to Baghdad, the world powers will stand accused of failing to defeat the terrorist group and of preventing Iraq’s collapse.

—

This article appeared first in Al Ahram Weekly on Aug, 6, 2015

Iraq-IS-Anbar

After Anbar

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After Anbar

The long-expected battle for Anbar has begun in Iraq, but there are huge concerns about its aftermath, writes Salah Nasrawi

For weeks, Iraqi security forces and Shia paramilitaries have been encircling the city of Ramadi, where the government is planning a major offensive to dislodge Islamic State (IS) terror group militants who captured the city, the capital of Anbar Province, some three months ago.

The Iraqi government has now announced the start of a campaign to retake the Sunni-dominated Anbar Province west of Baghdad on 13 July. The offensive includes plans to liberate Fallujah, which has been an IS stronghold since its seizure by extremists in January 2014.

There has been little information about the operation amid a government blackout and increasing concerns about the military and political strategy to fully pacify Anbar and other Sunni-populated provinces after taking them back from IS.

IS militants captured vast amounts of territory in Iraq, including the country’s second-largest city of Mosul, last year, following an uprising by Sunnis protesting against what they claimed was their exclusion and marginalisation by the Shia-led government.

With the Anbar campaign gaining momentum, thousands of Iraqi fighters have joined in the battle, with much of the main thrust of the offensive seemingly directed at Fallujah, some 60 km west of the capital Baghdad.

Iraqi officials say government forces, mainly Shia Popular Mobilisation Units and Sunni pro-government fighters, are taking part in the onslaught to retake this rebellious city. Fallujah was the scene of major battles with American forces following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

After the US troop withdrawal in 2011, Iraqi security forces fought the rebels as the city turned into a bastion of Sunni resistance against the Shia-led government. With the flare-up of the Sunni uprising in December 2012, the government gradually lost control of Fallujah to IS-led rebels.

Government spokesmen now say that Iraqi forces are making major strides in areas near Fallujah and that the city has fallen under a tight siege from four directions and leading to its centre, which they expect to soon fall.

Fallujah’s proximity to Baghdad makes it strategically important for the Iraqi government. While its liberation will drive IS militants far from the capital, Fallujah’s capture is also key to securing Ramadi and the rest of Anbar Province.

In the past few weeks, Iraqi security forces, Shia militias and local pro-government Sunni tribes have been moving to cut the militants’ supply lines and to surround and isolate Ramadi and Fallujah.

Last week, Iraq closed its border with Jordan until further notice. The closure is intended to choke off one of the militants’ sources of finance, depriving them of the taxes they impose on trucks driving through their territory.

But as the coalition of Iraqi forces takes up strategic positions closer to Fallujah and Ramadi, the key question is when will the major offensive to retake the two cities be launched.

Since the seizure of Ramadi in May, the Iraqi government has many times announced an operation to liberate Anbar, but there have not been any major advances on the ground. This could mean that there are disagreements about what strategies should be adopted in the battle for Anbar. The campaign could determine not only the course of the war against IS but also the tide of historical events in Iraq.

On Saturday, Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi said the push in Anbar was being conducted according to plans made some time ago. Like other government officials, Al-Abadi did not set a specific date for the start of the offensive, but he promised the province will eventually be liberated.

Leaders of the Shia militias, however, have announced that the decision to retake the two key cities should be taken by the government, highlighting difficulties in forging a unified strategy against IS.

The United States, which is taking part in the campaign by carrying out air strikes against IS targets, does not appear to support elements of the Anbar offensive, as planned by the Iraqi government.

Strategically, Washington has offered a timeline for the fight against IS that could be years long. Tactically, US generals have opposed a simultaneous operation to recapture both Ramadi and Fallujah, suggesting instead a speedy offensive in Ramadi in order to prevent IS from establishing itself in the city.

Operations against IS in Anbar may have begun to yield some results for Iraqi troops, which have been able to besiege IS militants in Ramadi and Fallujah and force them to slow down their advance. The Iraqi coalition may also be able to push back the militants to the desert or into neighbouring Syria.

But in order for the Iraqi government to regain control of the one third of its territory lost to the jihadists it needs a comprehensive strategy that can defeat IS and hasten its demise.

Recapturing Ramadi and Fallujah would change the situation dramatically in favour of the Iraqi Shia-led government, but Iraqi troops will still face further battles in Anbar on their way to take back Mosul, Iraq’s second city.

Baghdad needs a military approach that does not alienate the Sunni population and create further communal divisions in the divided and war-torn country. While the Shia-dominated Popular Mobilisation Units have proven to be a powerful partner in the war against IS, the government should be careful in deploying militias that have been known for heavy-handed actions and sometimes brutality against the local populations in liberated areas.

The army should also avoid collateral damage while conducting its operations in Anbar. The international human rights group Human Rights Watch has alleged that the Iraqi government has been dropping barrel bombs and may also have targeted a hospital in its battle with militants in the conflict-hit province.

Fear of both the militias and scorched-earth tactics have triggered a mass exodus from Anbar. Tens of thousands of civilians now find themselves trapped between IS militants ready to use them as human shields and a government suspicious of their loyalties.

Military means on their own will also never be enough to destroy the terror group. IS militants have been driven from many areas in Iraq, but they are still fighting on several fronts. In recent weeks IS sleeper cells in Baghdad have carried out a series of devastating bomb attacks targeting Shia areas and disrupted security forces defending the capital.

On Friday, an IS suicide bomber detonated a small truck in a crowded marketplace in Khan Bani Saad, east of Baghdad, killing some 130 people and wounding dozens of others in one of the deadliest single attacks in the country in years.

Retaking Anbar will certainly be a strategic victory over the IS militants, but Iraqi Shia leaders should start thinking of long-term successes rather than transitory gains. The campaign against the terror group will only be successful over the long term if the Iraqi government pursues an approach that overcomes the sectarian split and opens up towards the Sunnis.

With millions of Sunnis leaving areas under IS control amid reports that the terror group is using residents of Fallujah as human shields, the insurgents are losing the strategic depth they need to defend their territory.

Efforts should also be made to find solutions to the sectarian war by fully accommodating nationalist Sunnis who distance themselves from IS and other rebel groups and are ready to work for a political solution.

While a unified nationalist Sunni front remains essential to representing the interests of the Sunni community in Iraq, the Shia ruling factions should also give up the tactical alliance they have built with corrupt, power-hungry and acquiescent Sunni politicians since the 2003 US-led invasion.

This marriage of convenience has given inclusiveness a bad name. After driving IS militants out of occupied cities and towns, Iraq will need new arrangements in which the Sunnis can find their place in a new political set-up in the country. In the post-IS era, Iraq will need a new political system that forces the corrupt and inept multi-ethnic and sectarian political class to give up what has become an extremely lucrative arrangement. This will pave the way for a new leadership to come to power, one that is not based on religious or ethnic beliefs.

Indeed, the future of Iraq is now inevitably tied to the emergence of such secular leaders and movements. The war against IS is a make-or-break moment for the ill-fated nation.

This article appeared first in Al Ahram Weekly on July 23, 2015

 

 

Iraq-Kurds

Kurdish dreams in peril

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Kurdish dreams in peril

 Iraqi Kurdistan regional president Masoud Barzani’s ambitions to stay in power are proving costly for the Iraqi Kurds, writes Salah Nasrawi

 Last month the embattled president of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region Masoud Barzani set 20 August as the date for a direct national ballot to elect the Region’s president, only one day before his tenure comes to an end.

The decree was Barzani’s latest move on Kurdistan’s complicated political chessboard to outmanoeuvre opponents of his endeavour to win a new term in office despite restrictions by the Region’s draft constitution.

The main Kurdish political parties immediately rebuffed Barzani’s move as unconstitutional and insisted on a vote by members of the Kurdistan parliament in line with the Region’s legislation. 

The Independent Election Commission, the constitutional organ entitled to arrange and supervise balloting, also snubbed Barzani’s decision to hold the election without its approval.

Negotiations to end the dispute have thus far been deadlocked, raising speculation about how the incumbent president will act in order to avoid a governmental crisis in the autonomous Region that is already embroiled in a conflict with the Iraqi capital Baghdad and a fight with the Islamic State (IS) terror group.

At the centre of the controversy is Barzani’s desire to remain president despite legal and constitutional limits. The opposition argues that Barzani should leave office when his term ends on 19 August in order to pave the way for the parliament to choose a new president.

The row, touching the core of the Kurdistan Region’s fragile political system, has put its nascent democracy to its biggest test yet. If it is left unsolved, it will have dramatic repercussions on the Region’s stability and the political future of the Iraqi Kurds.

At the heart of crisis lies the failure of the Kurdish movement in Iraq to build a genuine union after it carved out self-rule status following the defeat of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War and his withdrawal from the Kurdish-populated north of Iraq.

Together, the two main political groups, Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by veteran nationalist Jalal Talabani, formed an administration to run Iraqi Kurdistan.

But what had been envisaged as a consensual democracy has been replaced in effect by a deeply incoherent system of power-sharing between the Region’s two main political groups, which have effectively turned Kurdistan into a shared autocracy.

In May 1992 the Iraqi Kurds held their first election to choose representatives for a legislative council. The aim was to form an administration to provide public services and to meet the basic needs of the population after Saddam’s retreat.

Having failed to achieve a majority in the Kurdistan National Assembly and form a government, the KDP and the PUK agreed to share power by dividing the seats in the government equally among themselves.

But instead of strengthening the emerging semi-autonomous Region, the process, which became known as a 50-50 deal between Barzani’s KDP and Talabani’s PUK, started to tear apart.

Gradually, the alliance started to deteriorate as the two parties fought over resources and government revenues and each of them remained entrenched in territories under its control, refusing to integrate into the union.

By 1996, the KDP, supported by Saddam’s republican guard, stormed Erbil, the Kurdish capital which was under PUK control, and claimed jurisdiction over the whole of Iraqi Kurdistan. Hundreds of their members were killed in fighting over territory and political clout.

While Barzani maintained his Party’s grip on most of Iraqi Kurdistan, PUK forces remained concentrated around the town of Sulaymaniya close to the Iranian border.

It was only after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 that toppled the Saddam regime that the KDP-PUL coalition imposed its control over the new administration in Kurdistan, which was declared a federal region by Iraq’s post-Saddam constitution.

Nevertheless, the power-sharing system soon proved to be dysfunctional. There are multiple reasons behind the agreement’s failure, including the traditional competition over power and resources and the heavy-handed rule both parties have imposed on the Region.

The underlining reason, however, was the rise of Gorran, or the Change Movement, in 2009 on a platform of political reform and combating corruption.

In the 2013 election, the group, whose leaders had split from the PUK, won the second largest number of seats in the parliament, altering the political landscape in the Region.

At the top of Gorran’s demands was to change the political system into a parliamentary one in which the prime minister would become the head of the government and the role of the president would be ceremonial.

Gorran soon succeeded in pushing for a draft constitution for the Region that curtails presidential powers and an election law that imposes a two-term limit for presidential tenure in office.

Barzani, 69, has led the KDP since the death of his eldest brother Idris in 1987. Idris succeeded their father, the nationalist Kurdish leader Moustafa Barzani, as commander of the Peshmerga forces in the guerrilla war against Baghdad.

Barzani was elected by the parliament as president of the Kurdistan Region for a four-year term in 2005. In 2009, he was re-elected by the general public according to a law passed by his Party’s majority in the parliament. The opposition have since contested the law, which they say violates Kurdistan’s draft constitution.

Under his rule, the government turned into a presidential system. The president is the head of the Kurdistan Region and wields huge powers, including commander of the military and security forces. The prime minister, who is appointed by parliament, runs many of the day-to-day duties of the cabinet.

Barzani’s last term in office, due to end in July 2013, was extended by two years by the Kurdish parliament on the grounds that the Region was not ready to elect a new president.

Growing speculation suggests that Barzani plans to stay president for life, and he has been promoting his eldest son, Masrour Barzani, as his successor. Masrour, who leads the intelligence service, already wields enormous power. His nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, is the KDP’s deputy chairman and the Region’s prime minister.

Other members of the Barzani family have also been dominant in the Region’s politics and economy.

Talabani, who served two terms as Iraq’s president after the US-led invasion in 2003 before falling sick, is also reportedly priming his 37-year-old son Qubad Talabani to take the reins.

Qubad was named a deputy prime minister in the government formed after the 2013 election. Talabani’s other son Bafel runs the Party’s intelligence department while other family members run a number of Party-affiliated organisations and businesses.

Barzani’s attempt to stay in power now seems beyond serious doubt. Everything he has done in recent weeks in relation to the presidential election crisis appears designed to buy time in order to outmanoeuvre the opposition groups into accepting his re-running for the post.

In the past, Barzani succeeded in stifling dissent either by buying off opponents or by playing for high stakes, knowing that the opposition groups were too weak to stop him from pursuing another term in office despite his long stay in power.

Barzani has been trying to settle the dispute outside the parliament in order to avoid public embarrassment. Last week, he called on the political parties to resolve the issue through “consensus,” warning the opposition that failure would “make the political and legal dispute more complicated.”

On 23 June, KDP members walked out of a parliamentary session held to discuss a bill that limited his powers. The Party’s spokesmen later accused the speaker of the parliament, Youssif Mohamed who is from Gorran faction, of inviting an Iranian diplomat to the crucial session. KDP officials have alluded to Iran’s support for the opposition in attempts to dislodge Barzani.

There is a profound sense of anxiety that the crisis of Kurdistan’s presidential election is now pushing the Region into stormy political waters.

With further escalation of the tension in the already politically fragile Middle East, there are concerns that without a peaceful resolution of the crisis Kurdistan will enter a new and unprecedented phase of uncertainty.

In a last-ditch bid to defuse the crisis Barzani sent his nephew and the Region’s prime minister Nechirvan Barzani to meet PUK and Gorran leaders to negotiate a two-year extension to his term in office.

Kurdistan has been struggling with conflicts that have led the Region to the brink of an exit from Iraq and all-out war with IS. As the expiration of Barzani’s tenure fast approaches, both sides may feel the need to stop the posturing and focus on salvaging the situation.

Yet, a sustainable solution to the Kurdistan government crisis seems in doubt unless there is a lasting deal on the political reforms demanded by the opposition.

For a traditional leader who has been using populism for political expediency, accepting a constitution and an election law that put limits on both his powers and his terms in office seems far-fetched.

For the opposition, a parliamentary political system that gives them a real voice is the only means to end the monopoly of power and wealth by Barzani’s KDP. If the opposition makes concessions on its demands, it will be discredited and weakened.

 

END

 

ما بعد التجربة

Assault on Iraqi writers

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Assault on Iraqi writers

Fear is hanging over secular Iraqi intellectuals following a militia raid on the Writers Union building in Baghdad, writes Salah Nasrawi

Last week’s attack on the offices of the Iraqi Union of Writers has led to fears that the country is turning into a nation ruled by fundamentalist militias and vigilante groups known for their bigotry and use of violence.

The dramatic rise of the self-styled religious extremist groups has been connected to growing pressure from the government and political groups on the media to show public support for the Shia Popular Mobilisation Forces which are battling the Islamic State (IS) terror group.

On 17 June about 50 black-clad gunmen stormed the headquarters of the Writers Union in downtown Baghdad. They beat up staff and guards and destroyed the offices of an organisation that has long taken pride in its secularism and defied rising sectarian extremism and religious fundamentalism.

The rampage shocked the intelligentsia of a nation that has been living in dread of a sectarian war since IS seized large parts of Iraq last summer. The attack by gunmen dressed in military uniforms triggered an outpouring of public anger at home and expressions of solidarity from around the world.

In a statement, the Union said that dozens of armed men attacked its offices and briefly held its guards and staff hostage. The assailants, who used SUVs without licence plates, set up temporary roadblocks to divert traffic in the area during the raid, the statement said.

It said the attackers seized identity cards, money and personal mobile phones from the Union’s employees and security guards and smashed furniture in offices before leaving.

Union President Fadel Thamir described the attack as an attempt to “turn Iraq into an extremist religious state like [Taliban-controlled] Afghanistan.” Thamir, a well-known literary critic, urged the government to “bring the perpetrators to justice and stop violations against writers.”

Said Thamir, “This aggression underscores the dangers to the lives and safety of all those who work in literature and cultural organisations.” The Shia-led government had no immediate reaction to the attack, but Baghdad’s chief of security promised an investigation.

Iraqi President Fouad Masum, a Kurd whose post is ceremonial and has no executive power, said the assault “undermines both the state and the rule of law.” He called on the authorities to provide protection to the Union and other organisations.

There has been no claim of responsibility for the attack, but from the little information available it seems clear that it was planned by an organised Shia-fundamentalist network, probably targeting a social club and bar on the premises.

The religiosity of society in Iraq has grown since the overthrow of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s secular regime in the US-led invasion in 2003. It is not unusual for hardline groups, sometimes working closely with the security forces, to raid alcohol shops, bars and nightclubs in Baghdad.

They step up their vigilante activities during Ramadan to ensure the Islamic fasting month is not tainted. Ramadan this year started on 18 June, a day before the raid on the Union building, but there were no reports of members or guests having been caught drinking alcohol during the raid.

Union member have been harassed by Shia fundamentalist vigilantes on many occasions before. In 2012, security forces stormed the social club in the building and forced all those who were there to leave under threat of violence.

Volunteer groups claiming to “promote virtue and prevent vice” on the streets have been chastising and, in some cases, physically assaulting and arresting people they consider to be sinful or behaving improperly.

In July, two dozen women and two men in an alleged brothel in Baghdad were murdered by gunmen who stormed the place. Scores of young people whose behaviour is perceived to be unconventional have been murdered in recent years.

There have been no investigations into these and other cases to determine the perpetrators, but many Iraqis believe it is clear who is responsible. They say the killings have been carried out by members of local militia or religious groups.

The attack against the Writers Union, however, raises broader questions about the Shia-led government’s policy toward culture in view of the increasing hostility to secular and moderate intellectuals in Iraq.

Following the fall of Saddam’s dictatorship, Iraqi writers, journalists and artists hoped that the country’s new rulers would make commitments to changes underpinned in the new constitution to build a participatory and inclusive democratic culture.

Unfortunately, the worst fears of the intelligentsia in the Arab part of Iraq have come true: Shia fundamentalist groups who came to power after Saddam’s fall have begun to impose their religious ideology and conservative lifestyle.

In Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan Region, which is under the rule of a heavy-handed political coalition government, free speech and political and intellectual dissent are hardly tolerated.

Today, Iraq lacks a national cultural policy with clear values and priorities able to promote democracy and diversity, sustain the country as a richly creative society and ultimately be the best hope for stability in what is now a dangerously unstable nation.

Post-Saddam Iraq has had no ministers of culture who were interested in their portfolio or took their jobs seriously. All the posts in the Ministry of Culture are now filled with political appointees or cronies with little or no cultural background or activities.

Under a chequebook reward system, thousands of carefully selected writers, journalists and artists receive financial support from the ministry each year.

But no philosophy or goals to affirm the centrality of culture and the arts to Iraq’s national identity and to ensure their role in strengthening national unity have been set. Individual creativity is rarely recognised or encouraged.

Threatened and frustrated, Iraqi intellectuals rarely form groups to oppose the government. Rather, individual intellectuals or groups of intellectuals ally themselves with cliques within the government to lend their support to the policies of the ruling groups.

Many Iraqi writers, artists and intellectuals have left Iraq for lives in exile out of fears of harassment, or because they have been deprived of jobs or opportunities. Those who have stayed and want to make a living in Iraq have had to cooperate with the state’s or ruling groups’ institutions, or resort to self-censorship.

Iraqi journalists have also been the targets of campaigns by the government or the ruling political class to stifle the media or buy their silence. Hundreds of media workers have been killed or murdered in violence since 2003, and independent journalists remain subject to intimidation, harassment and exclusion.

During the last 12 years, bit by bit, the Iraqi media has fallen into full compliance with the structures of power, most notably the government and those of the ruling cliques. The majority of the media outlets in Iraq are now either institutionally embedded with or submissive to the ruling groups. Almost all media owners or bosses are people who have nothing to do with journalism.

Iraqi journalists are subjected to sectarian polarisation in their daily practices. Acrimonious infighting, selective engagement in public causes and a lack of professionalism are common. As a result of cunning operations by both the government and complicit media organisations, Iraq now has a toothless mainstream media that lacks efficiency and influence, and is not trusted by the general public.

The country’s national media organisation, the Iraqi Media Network, has fallen under the total control of the state, as journalists who served in party propaganda machines or loyal bureaucrats with little or no knowledge of journalism and carefully chosen by the prime minister’s office have been appointed to key positions.

The Iraqi Journalists Syndicate is seen to be cozying up to the government and the political elite in return for protection and profits such as financial rewards, pensions and land.

The absence of objective and professional coverage has led to the widespread reporting of government propaganda, something that is sadly familiar to Iraqis from Saddam’s decades in power.

Since IS’s advances last summer, the government has increased its pressure on the media to make journalists follow the official propaganda line on the war against the terror group. Criticism or “negative reporting” are often labelled as treason or even denounced as betrayals of the Islamic creed.

Last week, local media reported that Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi has formed a “War Media Cell” to oversee and coordinate news reporting on the fighting with IS.

They said the main duty of the group will be to feed the media with the government’s narrative of the war and circulate news of the “successes” of the security forces and the Popular Mobilisation Force. It will also monitor local and international coverage of the war, the media said.

This article appeared first in Al Ahram Weekly on June 26, 2015

Iraq-Corruption

Iraq’s odd anti-graft drive

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Iraq’s odd anti-graft drive

The war against corruption in Iraq is being waged by an unexpected warrior, writes Salah Nasrawi

As Iraq’s war against the Islamic State (IS) group remains under the international spotlight, an anti-graft war in Baghdad has gone largely unnoticed. But while the war against IS could reshape Iraq’s future, the war against corruption seems to be the latest twist in the spat between Iraq’s competing politicians and rival groups.

For months, a Facebook account profiling Ahmed Chalabi, one of Iraq’s most controversial politicians and a high-level Shia official, has been trying to harness popular anger against corruption in the Shia-led government of Prime Minister Haider Al-Abbadi by releasing horrendous accounts of graft cases online.

Allegations of political corruption in Iraq have made their way onto the social networks before, but the new revelations are particularly significant because they are coming from Chalabi, who also serves as the head of the country’s Parliamentary Finance Committee.

Efforts made to reach Chalabi were unsuccessful, and messages copied to a second Facebook profile using Chalabi’s name to confirm the two pages’ authenticity went unanswered. However, an in-depth search has showed that although Chalabi has dismissed one posting in a statement, he has not asked to remove the Facebook account, which also carries the subtitle “community” with his name.

For many Iraq watchers the ambiguity behind the two Facebook pages will be deliberate in order to make the embarrassment go away. To them, the accounts and documents that detail the corruption cases can hardly be disputed and indicate reliable sourcing.

Few Iraqi officials named in the corruption episodes on Chalabi’s Facebook page sought to respond to the allegations or refute their authenticity, they note.

Why Chalabi, in the light of the watchers’ theory that the Facebook account is associated with him would want to wash the Shia-led government’s dirty linen in public remains unclear. But his anti-corruption drive has raised both doubts and speculation. While few Iraqis believe their political leaders are capable or willing to tackle the endemic graft problem in the country, many perceive Chalabi’s campaign as underlining a deep rift within the ruling Shia alliance.

Chalabi’s background sheds light on the aim behind his surprising anti-graft campaign. This former banker turned politician was a prominent figure in the Iraqi opposition that sought to oust former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein following the Gulf War in 1991.

Chalabi’s falsified reports about Baghdad’s weapons of mass destruction circulated by the mainstream US media were used as a pretext by the Bush administration to invade Iraq in 2003 and topple Saddam.

Chalabi, who became the darling of the Bush administration, was favoured by the Pentagon to succeed the former Iraqi dictator before he was found to be lacking public support inside Iraq. He was sidelined after he failed to receive a parliamentary seat in the first post-Saddam elections in 2005.

But the most striking aspect of his political career remains his involvement in a bank scam in Jordan, a scandal which is believed to have undermined his chances to run the country after Saddam. In 1992 a court in Jordan sentenced Chalabi to 22 years in prison in absentia and ordered the repayment of $30 million of the bank’s money it said he had embezzled.

Chalabi has always maintained the charges against him were politically motivated. But reports compiled by investigators for the international media have described how millions of dollars of depositors’ money was transferred to other parts of the Chalabi family empire in Switzerland, Lebanon and London and not repaid.

This seems like a dubious career for an anti-corruption campaigner and makes sceptics doubt his motivation. The disclosure also offers a rare insight into Iraq’s secret world of political corruption.

Chalabi, or those who run the Facebook page in his name, began posting tales of the horribly corrupt Iraqi government a few months ago. To ramp up public expectations he has been using “For a Better Iraq” as a slogan for his campaign.

Chalabi does not shy away from admitting that the US-led invasion, which he backed and pressed for more than 12 years ago, has been the main culprit in the massive corruption that has plagued Iraq since then.

For example, he cites two ministers appointed by the US-installed Coalition Provisional Authority who spirited away millions of dollars in graft before disappearing. Former minister of electricity Ayham Al-Samaraie was even helped out of a Baghdad jail by American security men who flew him out of Iraq.

“That is how it all started,” Chalabi said on his Facebook timeline. He said that the incident had set a precedent for the “smuggling” of prison inmates, even terrorists, to become routine in post-Saddam Iraq.

“This is how the blood of the Iraqis has become so cheap,” he wrote.

According to Chalabi’s narrative, corruption went viral throughout the two terms of former prime minister Nuri Al-Maliki’s rule in 2006-2014. After taking over from Al-Maliki, Al-Abbadi has not only failed to fulfill election promises to curb corruption but has also let the epidemic phenomena continue and grow.

One of the main reasons for government corruption to continue, in Chalabi’s view, is because Al-Abbadi still “relies on the same ignorant advisers and corrupt bureaucrats” as before. In a post this week, Chalabi wrote that one of Al-Abbadi’s advisers was a former butcher who had not obtained an education certificate.

“We will not stay silent, when we see you leaving the country in ruins,” Chalabi wrote. “You will lose local and international support, and you will not be able to continue your four-year term in office,” he warned Al-Abbadi.

A recurrent theme in Chalabi’s anti-graft postings is Iraq’s Independent Elections Commission. He cites several cases of corruption by commissioners, including profiteering and taking advantage of their posts to appoint relatives.

One commissioner, Chalabi wrote, had hired his brother who had presented a forged certificate. Another member, he wrote, was using a villa confiscated from a Saddam regime senior official as a residence without paying rent. A third, he said, received 12 million dinars monthly salary in addition to 20 million dinars for security while he spent most of his time abroad.

Another target of the Chalabi campaign is the Iraqi Central Bank (ICB). He has made scathing criticisms of the ICB governor, Ali Al-Allak, who he has blamed for the recent sharp depreciation of the local currency.

According to Chalabi, Al-Allak has no previous experience in banking or finance and was living on welfare in Canada before he was made Al-Maliki’s chief of staff. “He did not even work as an accountant in a grocery store,” Chalabi wrote.

Chalabi ranted in one posting at the government department responsible for displaced Iraqis. While millions of Iraqis have been seeking refuge from violence in other towns or live in dusty tent cities facing the summer heat and shortages of water and electricity, millions of dollars in government and foreign aid have disappeared.

Chalabi’s list of corruption is long and includes allegations of bribery to release imprisoned terrorists, money-laundering and racketeering by officials and journalists.

The response to Chalabi’s Facebook tirades have not been entirely positive. They have even sparked a backlash on the social network, with many users pointing out that Chalabi has failed to carry out his duties as an MP and head of the Parliamentary Finance Commission to take legal and constitutional action to pursue corrupt officials.

“Be brave and unveil all the corruption cases and take offenders to court,” wrote one user. “This is good, but you are head of the Finance Committee, so why don’t you question them in parliament,” responded another.

“One seat and one voice wield no influence inside the parliament,” came the answer to the comments on the timeline.

Instead of stoking up publicity, exposing corruption scandals in Iraqi on social media has proved to be more of a political blood sport than a call for a reckoning. Corruption has become deeply entrenched in the bureaucratic and political system of the country, and few Iraqis believe their political leaders are capable or willing to tackle the endemic graft problem.

Most of Iraq’s political class are believed to be involved in one type of corruption of another, manipulating the country’s rich resources in order to create rents they can use to secure control of the government.

Corruption in Iraq is not only widespread and endemic, but also systematic and institutionalised. It includes bribery, embezzlement, money-trafficking and laundering, extortion, patronage, cronyism, fraud, legal plunder, nepotism and plutocracy.

In 2014, the international NGO Transparency International said Iraq was the fifth most corrupt country in the world out of the 175 countries surveyed.

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This article appeared first in Al- Ahram Weekly on June 18, 2015