Slow, but steady

Iraq and Kuwait are making slow progress towards lifting the UN-imposed sanctions on Baghdad, but a full rapprochement could take time, writes Salah Nasrawi

More than 22 years after former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait after accusing its rulers of strangling Iraq by keeping oil prices low through pumping more than its quota and stealing from the two countries’ shared oil fields, relations between Iraq and its southern Gulf neighbour remain cool, signalling difficulties in resolving the long-running saga.
A key obstacle to warming relations are the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq following the invasion and Kuwait’s refusal to lift the punishment nearly ten years after the ouster of Saddam in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, despite the Iraqis’ appeals to Kuwait to relieve them of the penalties.
Kuwait still receives five per cent of Iraq’s oil and gas revenues as compensation for the 1990 invasion, and it refuses to let up on other penalties imposed under chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Since 1994, when the UN set up a reparations fund, Baghdad has paid some $40 billion to Kuwait with a further $13 billion in compensation still due. There are also several other issues stemming from the Iraqi invasion, including land and maritime borders between the two countries.
The controversy came under the spotlight last week when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon visited Kuwait and Iraq in a bid to end the dispute. Kuwait’s Prime Minister Sheikh Jaber Al-Mubarak, is also expected to travel to Iraq next month for discussion on the issues that block normalising relations with Iraq.
A look back at the history of relations between the two neighbouring countries indicates that the row is deep-rooted. Successive Iraqi governments never accepted the British-drawn borders that established Kuwait as a separate sheikhdom after the signature of the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913.
In 1961, Iraq’s then prime minister, Abdel-Karim Kassem, refused to recognise Kuwait’s independence of that year and declared the entity to be an integral part of Iraq. However, he did not send in troops to back up his claim.
Relations between the two countries deteriorated for economic and diplomatic reasons that culminated in Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Saddam alleged that Kuwait was conspiring with Iraq’s enemies to undermine its oil-based economy and that it was stealing oil by slant drilling across the border into Iraqi oil fields.
Later, Saddam justified the invasion by claiming that Kuwait was a “natural part” of Iraq carved off as a result of British imperialism.
However, Saddam’s army was driven out of Kuwait six months after the invasion by a US-led international coalition, and Iraq subsequently remained under scathing sanctions that claimed the lives of millions of Iraqi children and the sick and elderly, with particularly devastating effects on the country’s economy.
Most of the sanctions were removed after Saddam’s downfall, but the Iraq-Kuwait issues have remained a red line under the UN Security Council’s care, as Kuwait has insisted.
Among the issues Kuwait still insists on are war reparations, border demarcation, the restoration of Kuwaiti property, and the fate of Kuwaitis missing or taken prisoner by Saddam’s army.
While the Iraqis have complied with the UN resolutions and have remained committed to paying the remaining compensation due to Kuwait, as well as maintaining border signs and seeking means to determine the fate of the missing Kuwaitis, Iraq also wants Kuwait to negotiate bilaterally, and it has asked the United Nations to remove Iraq from the chapter VII sanctions.
“Frankly, we want to close the outstanding files, bearing in mind that it was not we who invaded Kuwait, but an adventurer who brought conflict to our two countries and slaughtered so many people,” Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki told a group of Kuwaiti journalists last week, in a reference to Saddam.
On Monday, Iraq’s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, took the Iraqi move a step further and summoned the Baghdad ambassadors of the Security Council’s permanent member states to tell them that Iraq had fulfilled its commitments and that it was time to release the country from its chapter VII obligations.
Iraq has also taken steps to end the other remaining disputes with Kuwait, including sending back the remains of 265 people out of the about 600 declared missing since the invasion, and cooperating in returning Kuwaiti archives and documents.
The Iraqi government has recently approved a $500 million deal to settle a financial dispute between Kuwaiti Airways and Iraqi Airways and end litigation in a dispute over Kuwaiti civilian planes moved to Iraq during the occupation.
Last week, the Iraqi government named a technical team to take part in a joint border post maintenance project, and it said it would provide a list of Iraqi farmers on the border that were entitled to compensation after the demarcation.
On Sunday, Reuters reported that Iraq had asked Kuwait Energy to acquire shares in Turkey’s state-owned TPAO’s exploration block of nine oil fields after the Iraqi cabinet decided to expel the Turkish company from the project.
Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Hussein Sharastani also said on Sunday that the two governments had agreed to start investing jointly in oil fields along their common border as part of an effort to end remaining differences.
However, up till now Kuwait has remained defiant and has brushed off Iraqi demands to end the sanctions under the UN chapter, insisting that Iraq should be kept under UN scrutiny for now.
Ahead of Ban Ki-Moon’s visit, Kuwait’s permanent representative to the UN, Mansour Al-Otaibi, told the KUNA national news agency that his country “shall push for Iraq meeting what remains of its obligations, as stated by the UN Security Council resolutions”.
Deputy Foreign Minister Khaled Al-Jarallah told a local newspaper last week that the Gulf emirate would not relieve Iraq of either the war reparations or the debts, which Iraq says come to about $6 billion.
Kuwait says Iraq owes it around $16 billion as a result of loans made to Saddam to fight the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran War, which was largely bankrolled by the oil-rich Gulf state.
For its part, the United Nations, which should have the last word on whether Iraq has complied with its obligations, has remained undecided.
While in Kuwait last week, Ban Ki-Moon said he was “committed to normalisation and to ensuring that Iraq fulfills all of its outstanding international obligations regarding Kuwait, as the Security Council has mandated.”
That can hardly be seen by Iraqis as an encouraging sign. Many Iraqis are sceptical about the UN and believe that the organisation is acting as a proxy to keep Iraq under control.
In addition to freezing large amounts of Iraq’s revenues in UN-controlled bank accounts to pay compensation to those affected by the invasion, the chapter provisions allow the use of force against Iraq should it become a threat to international security.
On Saturday, an Iraqi lawmaker criticised the United Nations for still maintaining the “unjust” sanctions. “This injustice imposed on Iraq should be lifted as long as Iraq has fulfilled its obligations and is no longer a threat to international peace and stability,” Alia Nusaif wrote in a letter to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI).
“The United Nations should shoulder its responsibility and end Iraq’s status under chapter VII and not leave that to Kuwait’s wishes,” she wrote.
Iraqi officials now hope that a visit by Kuwait’s Prime Minister Sheikh Jaber Al-Mubarak to Baghdad next month will contribute to the resolution of the remaining issues and pave the way for Iraq to be removed from the humiliating sanctions.
On Saturday, a Kuwaiti newspaper quoted Al-Mubarak as saying that his country was “ready to [do] whatever it takes to remove Iraq from chapter VII in line with the diplomatic framework and UN resolutions”.
However, understandable though these high Iraqi expectations and Kuwaiti measured promises may be, under prevailing circumstances a breakthrough in ending the penalties imposed under chapter VII soon does not look feasible.
Distrust and suspicion between the two countries are deeply rooted, and the way this dispute in Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations is handled will go a long way towards determining the nature of the society in each country and the Gulf’s security profile.
“I am concerned that progress could be threatened by the lack of confidence between the two countries and a lack of progress on outstanding issues,” Ban Ki-Moon said during his visit to the region last week.

Iranian pressure on Iraq

Iran appears to be pushing Iraq closer to the rejectionist camp in a new contest for regional power, writes Salah Nasrawi

When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, many American supporters of the war argued that moving against former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein earlier rather than later would create the conditions for a new and more realistic Middle East peace process.
That grandiose hypothesis never came to pass, and now there is compelling evidence that Tehran, which has been increasing its influence in Iraq following the US withdrawal last year, is pushing its allies in Baghdad’s Shia-led government against Israel, Iran’s arch-enemy.
Iran’s new strategy in Iraq seems to be designed to push Iraq into the rejectionist front that urges permanent hostilities against Israel, in order to replace the tottering regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Other members of the camp are the Lebanese Shia Hizbullah group and radical Palestinian factions such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Last week, the visiting Iranian speaker of parliament, Ali Larijani, broke significant new ground in Iran’s ambitions in Iraq. During talks with senior Iraqi officials and top Shia clerics, Larijani emphasised the need for Iraq to back Iran’s bid for regional power.
“Iran and Iraq are among the key influential countries in the region, and they should have unified visions and positions vis-à-vis events in the region,” said Larijani while in Baghdad.
Upon his return to Tehran, Larijani said that all the Shia clerics whom he had met in Iraq “are aware of Tehran’s key role in regional developments, especially in Gaza,” adding that they considered “Iran to be the main cause of the Gazans’ victory over the Zionist regime” during last month’s eight-day Israeli assault on Gaza.
Iraq and Iran fought a war in 1980-1988 that cost the two nations some one million casualties, but Iran tightened its grip on its strife-torn neighbour following the US-led invasion of the country in 2003 by backing Iraq’s Shia political parties, which were sheltered in Iran under Saddam’s regime.
Since the downfall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, Iran and Iraq have enjoyed a good economic relationship. Iran’s exports and investment in Iraq are estimated at $10 billion, second only to Turkey, and reports suggest that the country plans to double its investment in Iraq to $25 billion next year.
Iran’s influence in Iraq also covers political, military, religious and social ties.
Since the American departure last December, Iran has managed to protect its core alliance and increase its standing with Iraq’s Shia political groups, which dominate the government in Baghdad.
In October, Iranian Defence Minister Brigadier-General Ahmed Vahidi said the countries had signed a bilateral defence cooperation agreement.
During his visit to Baghdad, Larijani appeared to be using Iran’s massive influence in Iraq to shape the country’s policies on several key issues, including Israel’s recent war on Gaza, which has been ruled by Hamas since 2007.
Iran is Hamas’s strongest regional ally and the main supplier of weapons to the Palestinian factions.
More than 1,200 rockets believed to be manufactured or shipped by Iran were fired from Gaza during Israel’s war on the Strip last month. The weapons included Fajr-5 rockets believed to have been used by the Palestinians factions to hit Israeli cities during the eight-day war.
Iran prides itself on this missile, described by its media as a two-stage weapon system appropriate for asymmetric wars, such as the one Hamas and Israel fought last month.
Iraqi officials have not publicly commented on the new Iranian resolve to nudge Iraq closer to the rejectionist front in anticipation of the collapse of the Al-Assad regime, but Tehran has received sympathetic hearings from Iraqis in Shia theological institutions and in parliament.
Mohamed Bahr Al-Ulloum, a top cleric in the Najaf theological seminary, last week thanked Iran for what he called its military assistance to the Palestinian resistance groups during the recent Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip.
Shia lawmaker Jawad Al-Bazouni said “Iran’s Fajr-5 missiles restored the Arabs’ and Muslims’ dignity.”
These statements echoed those of Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who urged the Arab states during the war to use all political means possible, including raising oil prices, to end the Israeli attacks on Gaza and suggested that these could be as effective as military action against Israel.
Beyond the rhetoric, however, Iran seems to be making headway. 
At a press conference with Larijani, Iraq’s parliamentary speaker Osama Al-Nujaifi said he was planning a meeting of the heads of parliaments in neighbouring countries in Baghdad soon to address regional issues.
Larijani praised Iraq’s proposal and suggested that regional governments “should take this initiative as an opportunity to solve the Gaza crisis.”
Meanwhile, Al-Nujaifi traveled to Gaza last week taking with him $2 million in cash donated by the Baghdad government to the Palestinians.
His trip came hard on the heels of a visit by Iraq’s foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, who headed an Arab delegation to Gaza to show solidarity with the territory.
The head of the pro-government Iraqi Journalists Syndicate, Moaed Al-Lami, also travelled to Gaza, while an Iraqi football team plans to hold a friendly match in the Palestinian territories soon.
Such visits are considered to be landmarks because Iraqi Shia officials have previously shied away from the Palestinians, whom they had previously accused of supporting Saddam and hailing him as a hero.
Of even greater significance is the fact that Iraq has called for the holding of a meeting of the Arab states’ chiefs of staff over the ongoing Gaza violence.
Arab League Secretary-General Nabil Al-Arabi said Iraq had suggested the meeting to “discuss the risks the region is exposed to amid the Israeli aggression on Gaza”.
Ahead of an Arab foreign ministers meeting on the Israeli onslaught on Gaza last month, Iraq’s envoy to the Arab League, Kais Al-Azzawi, announced that Baghdad would invite the Arab states to use oil as a weapon to press for a halt to the Israeli attacks on Gaza.
He later withdrew the remarks, apparently after other Arab governments objected.
Iran has also used its growing influence in Iraq to shape the country’s policies on Syria, including efforts to breathe new life into the struggling Al-Assad regime.
Tehran is Al-Assad’s strongest regional ally, and it stands to lose considerable influence in the region if the regime falls.
Iraq is believed to have allowed Iran to transport arms to Syrian government forces through Iraqi airspace, despite US demands to stem the shipments.
American officials told the New York Timeson Saturday that Iraq continued to allow Iranian aircraft carrying weapons through its airspace to Syria in defiance of the American concerns.
For his part, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki said that his country was unable to search all Syria-bound Iranian planes that fly through Iraqi airspace. Iraqi minister of transportation Hadi Al-Amiri, whose ministry is responsible for the inspections, warned that the goal of the US efforts was “to weaken the armies of Iraq and Syria in line with Israel’s interests”.
Al-Amiri, also secretary-general of the Badr Organisation, a pro-Iran Shia militia, cautioned that “a serious and clandestine plot is underway to weaken and target the two armies of Syria and Iraq.”
One reason for Iran to step up its pressure on Iraq to join its crumbling rejectionist club appears to be the rapid and drastic changes in Middle East geopolitics triggered by the Arab Spring.
In the latest conflict in Gaza, Iran watched warily as the new Islamist president of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, reaped the returns of long-term investments in Hamas.
Iran believes that while Morsi is taking advantage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to improve his Islamist movement’s standing with the United States and become a major Middle East player, it is losing influence among the militant Palestinian factions and probably its long-standing alliances with them.
In the absence of the Al-Assad regime in Syria, Iran hopes that Iraq’s predominantly Shia government will be a new key Arab ally in the region.
Unfortunately for Iran, its endeavour to push beleaguered Iraq into the Israel-Palestine conflict doesn’t make sense. Furthermore, in a new Middle East shaped by the Arab Spring old-style political gambits are becoming increasingly irrelevant.

Widening divisions in Iraq

The Iraqi Kurds and the country’s Shia-led government have postponed their fight over disputed areas, but the divide is sharpening, writes Salah Nasrawi

The political divide in Iraq is widening as Kurdish leaders continue their criticism of Shia Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki despite efforts to defuse tensions following a military stand-off along the frontier with the Kurdish provinces in northern Iraq.
The row underscores a bitter falling-out between the Kurds and the Shias whose political coalition has been in power since the removal of the Sunni-led regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in the US-led invasion in 2003.
Tensions between Baghdad and the autonomous Kurdistan region in northern Iraq have risen after Al-Maliki formed a new military command covering disputed territories in September in order to address the deterioration in security in the areas, which have been the scene of terrorist attacks in recent months.
Last week, the Kurdish region sent reinforcements to these areas, where its troops are involved in a stand-off with the Iraqi army and security forces. Kurdish military commanders later said that their Peshmerga military forces were fully prepared to defend the region against any assault by government troops.
On Monday, senior military officials from both sides reached a preliminary agreement to pull back their forces to their “previous positions” and “reactivate joint security committees for coordination in the disputed areas.”
A statement from the office of Al-Maliki, who is also the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi armed forces, said the two sides had agreed to “start pacifying the situation.”
The deal was brokered by Iraq’s parliamentary speaker Osama Al-Nujaifi after talks with Kurdish President Massoud Barzani on Friday. Washington has also reportedly intervened to end the stand-off and ease tensions, with news agencies reporting that Monday’s meeting was attended by Lieutenant-General Robert Caslen, head of the US military mission in Baghdad.
The agreement was probably good enough to de-escalate the stand-off, but it has left open the future of the Dijla Operations Command that triggered the dispute over the areas the Kurdish region wants to incorporate over the strong objections of Baghdad.
These areas, larger in size than the three provinces of Kurdistan and including the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, have been policed by Kurdish security forces since the US invaded Iraq.
Hours before the agreement was signed in Baghdad, Nechirvan Barzani, premier of the Kurdistan Regional Government, said the Kurds would not accept any solution that placed Kurdish security forces in Kirkuk under the new command.
Other Kurdish leaders were even more sanguine, with Kurdish President Jalal Talabani reprimanding the commander of Iraq’s ground forces, General Ali Ghaidan, for sending troops to the disputed areas.
Kurdish news outlet Rudaw quoted a senior Kurdish official on Monday as saying that Talabani had threatened Ghaidan, also commander-in-chief of the Dijla Operations Command, to be put on trial if he did not withdraw the Iraqi troops from the disputed areas immediately.
Also on Monday, Barzani was quoted by Al-Jazeera.net as saying that Kurdistan would win any war with Baghdad, if one ever broke out. Al-Jazeera said that Barzani had also accused Al-Maliki of planning to invade Kurdistan.
“Al-Maliki’s expiry date has come, and it is impossible to work with him any longer,” Al-Jazeera.net reported. “He is procrastinating, outmaneuvering and violating all the agreements,” Barzani added. “He says something and then does the opposite.”
Another Kurdish leader said that the Peshmergas would “fight in defence of their gains and the experiment of the region of Kurdistan. The people of Kurdistan will never be subjected again to the mercy of dictatorship and chauvinism,” Braham Saleh told a gathering in Kurdistan on Monday.
The latest flare-up began last week when Iraqi troops clashed with Kurdish soldiers belonging to Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party (PUK) in Tuz Khurmato some 150km south of Erbil, the Kurdish provincial capital.
The clashes left one civilian dead and several wounded, including two PUK fighters and 13 Iraqi security men.
Following the skirmishes, Barzani urged Iraqi Kurds to be prepared for “any unwanted eventualities”. Soon afterwards, Kurdish troops and tanks were dispatched to the disputed areas.
Kurdish military officials said the reinforcements would hold their positions unless Iraqi forces made a move. Mahmoud Sankawi, a Peshmerga military commander, said his troops were prepared to confront those he described as “occupying forces”.
The reinforcements and the rhetoric prompted Al-Maliki’s office to warn the Peshmergas “not to change their positions or approach the [federal] armed forces.”
The Iraqi army and the Peshmergas have previously come close to military confrontation, only to pull back after reaching an understanding through intermediaries.
In August, Washington intervened to help end a stand-off between Iraqi troops and Kurdish forces that were on the verge of a confrontation over policing the border with Syria.
The Kurds charge that the Dijla Operations Command is a threat to them and an attempt by Al-Maliki to seize control of the disputed territories.
For his part, Al-Maliki says the command is necessary to keep law and order in three of Iraq’s most volatile provinces, Diyala, Kirkuk and Salaheddin, which border Kurdistan.
However, the conflict illustrates how far relations between the old allies have deteriorated, testing Iraq’s federal union nearly a year after the US withdrawal.
Relations between the country’s Kurds and Shias have also worsened over other long-running disputes. Tensions rose after Al-Maliki started showing signs of wanting to expand his power base, and a row erupted in December after Iraqi Vice President Tarek Al-Hashemi fled Baghdad for the autonomous Kurdish region, in order to avoid prosecution at the hands of the Shia-led central government on charges of terrorism and running death squads.
Iraqi Kurdistan has signed oil deals with major multinational companies that the Baghdad authorities have described as illegal, and trouble seems to be brewing again about Iraq’s so-called “disputed territories”.
Earlier this year, Barzani described Al-Maliki as a “dictator” and demanded that he be removed from power. Shia leaders have also sparred aggressively with Barzani, with one of Al-Maliki’s closest aides accusing the Kurdish leader of being a “a real danger” to Iraq.
Yassin Majid also said that Barzani “wants Erbil to hold a political role at the expense of Baghdad”.
On Saturday, Barzani turned down an invitation from Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr to meet with Al-Maliki to discuss the situation. In a statement posted on the Kurdistan Regional Government’s website, Barzani’s spokesman said he had refused because the matter was not personal, but rather a result of Al-Maliki’s “constant lack of commitment to the constitution”.
The political crisis and military stand-off have thrust the Kurdish-Shia alliance into the light of the day and in doing so has deeply unsettled much of Iraq. If the conflict is not handled carefully, there is the potential for clashes between the military forces under the two’s command.
“The Kurdish-Shia alliance is a lie. There was such an alliance during the opposition against Saddam, but it ended with the downfall of his regime,” said Sami Al-Askari, a senior member of Al-Maliki’s Daawa Party.



                              في الصميم
                       تحليلات ومتابعات
               هل نرى العراق قريبا دولة ممانعة؟
                                                        صلاح النصراوي
البدابة كانت الاسبوع الماضي حين زارها وزير الخارجية هوشيار زيباري ثم تلاه رئيس مجلس النواب اسامة النجيفي ولحقهم بعد ذلك في غضون ايام نقيب الصحفيين مؤيد اللامي…المسؤولون العراقيون بدؤا يصلون الى غزة الفلسطينية تباعا ويصلون معها حبال ود انقطعت منذ زمن بعد ان اعتبروا اهل القطاع مؤيدين لنظام صدام حسين ضد النظام الجديد.
والسؤال هو مالذي حصل وجعل المسؤولين العراقيين يتذكرون غزة ومعاناة اهلها فجأة ..هذا طبعا بغض النظر عن التبرير المعلن وهو التضامن مع غزة بعد الاعتداءات الاسرائيلية الاخيرة.
زيارة رئيس مجلس الشورى الإيراني علي لاريجاني الحالية للعراق والمباحثات التي يجريها مع المسؤولين العراقيين توفر بعض الاجابات عن هذا التساؤل بشأن التغير المفاجئ في السلوك العراقي تجاه غزة.
في بغداد اعلن لاريجاني ان جزءاً من مباحثاته مع المسؤولين العراقيين يتركز على سعي بلاده الى الاتفاق مع العراق على دعم المقاومة الفلسطينية، وهو مايعني بلغة الايرانيين اكبر طرف في تيار الممانعة، منظمتي حماس والجهاد الاسلامي.
لاريجاني اعلن ايضا بعد ان اعرب عن سعادته “مما جرى في غزة من قصم ظهر اسرائيل” بانه اتفق مع زميله رئيس البرلمان العراقي اسامة النجيفي على “التنسيق مع اتحادات البرلمانات الاسيوية والاسلامية من اجل دعم القضية الفلسطينية.”
وتابع لاريجاني في كشف المستور بقوله “هنالك جهد من قبل العراق وايران لتطويق وحل الازمات في المنطقة”، مضيفا أن “المستقبل سيشهد انعقاد اجتماع في بغداد لرؤساء البرلمانات العربية والاسلامية.”
ومضى لاريجاني بالقول “إن العراق وإيران من الدول الكبيرة في المنطقة ولهما تأثيرهما، ولا بد من توحيد الرؤى والمواقف إزاء ما يحدث في المنطقة.”
النائب عن التحالف الوطني الشيعي جواد البزوني كان اكثر وضوحا حين صرح بان  “صواريخ “فجر” الايرانية التي قدمتها إيران الى فصائل المقاومة الفلسطينية “اعادت الهيبة للامة العربية والاسلامية تجاه العدو الاسرائيلي، وليس لفلسطين فقط.”
وقال البزوني في تصريح نقلتها عنه وكالة انباء فارس الايرانية الاربعاء ان “تلك الصواريخ اعادت للامة هيبتها واثبتت انه لا توجد قبة حديدية مثلما يزعم العدو الاسرائيلي”، داعيا الى ان تستثمر تلك القوة وان يكون هناك دعم للفصائل الفلسطينية من اجل حفظ التوازن.
ودعا البزوني الى “دعم المقاومة ضد الكيان الاسرائيلي على طول الحدود ليس فقط في فلسطين بل في لبنان وسوريا.
تحليل هذه التحركات والتصريحات يصب في اتجاه واحد وهو مسعى العراق لتوثيق علاقاته مع غزة حماس.والسؤال لماذا يفعل العراق ذلك الان وفي هذه المرحلة التي تفقد ايران شيئا فشيئا حلبفها الرئيسي في جبهة الممانعة.
طبيعي ان يكون السؤال هو هل تحاول طهران ان تستبدل بغداد بدمشق كبوابة عربية في الجبهة التي نساها الناس منذ ثورات الربيع العربي العام الماضي؟ والسؤال الاهم هو هل بغداد مؤهلة لذلك؟

Genocide and the Kurds

Iraq’s Kurds want the world to recognise the mass murders their community suffered under the former Saddam regime as genocide, writes Salah Nasrawi
Nearly 25 years after the gassing of Kurds in Iraq‘s northern town of Halabja, Iraqi Kurds have begun a worldwide campaign for the massacre of their people during Saddam Hussein’s era to be formally recognised as genocide.

The move comes as tension rises between the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the central Baghdad government amid speculation that Iraq’s fragile ethnic federation could be in trouble and signs of increasing Kurdish frustration with the union.

A delegation from the Kurdistan Regional Government started a visit to the UN headquarters in New York this week in a bid to solicit support from UN member states to its request.
Kurds around the world have also started a campaign to press governments and parliaments to do the same.
The campaign hopes that official recognition will be the first step towards the UN bringing formal charges against individuals at international tribunals. It could also heighten Kurdish nationalism and give the Kurds a shot at fulfilling their dream of getting international recognition for an independent Kurdistan.  
The Kurds accuse the former Saddam regime of using chemical weapons against them in the 1980s in an attempt to put down Kurdish demands for autonomy within Iraq.
In the most notorious attack, they say, regime warplanes dropped chemical bombs on the town of Halabja in March 1988, killing some 5,000 men, women and children.
Some 715 victims of the attack are believed to be still alive, many of them suffering from serious aliments, including cancer.
Campaigners also say that many other innocent people were murdered as part of a sustained campaign to wipe out Kurdish villages in Iraq in 1987 and 1988 near the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War.
There is an agreement that hundreds of thousands of Kurds died in the decade-long conflict, during which the Kurds were fighting the Iraqi army for self-rule. Some Kurds were deported from their villages, and others were sent as far as southern Iraq.
After the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saddam was convicted of crimes against humanity and other crimes during the 1987-88 crackdown on the Kurds. However, he was not tried on charges of genocide.
Article 2 of the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide describes it as the carrying out of acts intended “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”.
Many legal experts believe that genocide may be hard to prove under this definition because there must be an intention to destroy a particular group.
Last year, in a non-binding decision the Iraqi parliament recognised the killings in Halabja as genocide, but the atrocity has not been recognised as such by the Baghdad government. The Kurds are now considering going to Iraq’s supreme court to obtain this recognition.
The dispute about whether the killings in Halabja were genocide centres on the question of whether they were systematic, premeditated and orchestrated.
The Kurds believe they were, but a number of Iraqi and foreign observers have questioned this assertion.
Even now, few people know what happened in Halabja on 16 March 1988. Some key elements of the events remain disputed, but what is known for certain is that Halabja, a small town of a few thousand people on the Iranian border, was bombarded with poison gas.
No one is in a position to answer with any certainty the multiple questions about all the circumstances surrounding the tragedy.
A US government report suggested that it might have been Iran, and not Iraq, that carried out the killings in Halabja.
The United States Defense Intelligence Agency investigated the allegations immediately after the event and produced a classified report that asserted that it was Iranian gas that killed the Kurds.
The agency said that each side had used gas against the other in the battle around Halabja. However, the condition of the dead Kurds’ bodies indicated that they had been killed with a cyanide-based gas, which Iran was known to use, according to the report.
The Iraqis, who are thought to have used mustard gas in battle, are not known to have possessed cyanide agents at the time, the report concluded.
However, the Kurds and their supporters in the media blamed this conclusion on the then Reagan administration in the US’s indifference and its attempts to get closer to Saddam, then seen as a friend of the United States.
They say that the agency report allowed the Saddam regime to use the US statements to deflect criticism against it.
Critics also say that a UN team that investigated the claims also failed to pursue evidence of Iraqi chemical weapons attacks on Kurdish refugees that it saw during a visit to a town in Iranian Kurdistan, claiming that the issue was not within the mission’s terms of reference.
Observers also differ on the circumstances that led to the battle of Halabja and the role of the Kurdish peshmergas fighters in the tragic episode.
Officials from the former Saddam regime have always said that Kurdish fighters belonging to Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party led Iranian Revolutionary Guards into the town, putting the Kurds’ lives in danger since the town was facing an imminent Iraqi counteroffensive.
A closer look at events during this chapter of the Iran-Iraq war reveals an Iranian role in the tragedy of Halabja, since as the War wound down in 1988 the Iranian military unleashed a major offensive on the northern front, trying to take territory and build up a bridgehead inside Iraq for further infiltration inside Kurdistan.
The present writer was in the northern war zone in the days before the attack on Halabja, while covering the battles for the Associated Press.
In interviews with commanders of Iraqi army units based in the Sharazour Valley near Halabja only two days before the gassing in the town, mention was made of an imminent Iranian offensive to capture the Valley, which opens onto Suleimaniya, Kurdistan’s second-largest city.
According to these commanders, the other major goal of the Iranian offensive, codenamed Wa Al-Fajr-10, was to capture the strategic hydro-electric dam of Darbandikhan, the main source of electricity for Baghdad, just south of Halabja.
In a report filed from Darbandikhan on 14 March, 1988, several Kurdish civilians were quoted as saying that they had been injured by Iranian chemical weapons in attacks on their villages on the border with Iran.
Jafer Barazanchi, the then regional governor who now lives in Kurdistan, said that a “mass evacuation” of Darbandikhan’s population was being considered out of fears of a further Iranian thrust deeper inside Iraq.
The Iranians seized Halabja on 15 March, and the development was serious enough to prompt Iraqi officers to remove journalists from the battlefield.
No news was heard about Halabja until a few days later, when Iran flew a group of Western reporters already in Tehran to the site to show them hundreds of dead bodies in Halabja’s deserted streets that it said had been left by Iraq’s use of poison gas against the town.
There has been no Iraqi government response to the Kurds’ demands for recognition of the Halabja gassing as genocide, and the country’s Shia-led government may be reluctant to support an effort that may lead to the finger being pointed at its allies in Shia Iran.
However, Saddam loyalists have launched their own campaign to discredit the Kurdish bid and deny that the Iraqi army carried out the atrocities.
Several former Saddam regime officials have written to deny the charges and blame Iran for the atrocities. They include Jafar Dhia Jafar, head of Saddam’s nuclear programme, General Hossam Mohamed Amin, a senior official in Saddam’s weapons programme, and Ambassador Muafak Jassim Al-Anni, in charge of the US desk at Saddam’s Foreign Ministry.
No country has yet formally recognised the killing of the Iraqi Kurds in 1988 as genocide, and it is unlikely that the UN or other international organisations or countries will do so, at least for now.
The Kurds seem to think that recognition of genocide may provide them with an opportunity to advance their national ambitions and put these on the international agenda.
While many Iraqis assent to the Kurds’ right for the atrocities to be condemned and fully exposed, others argue that investigating what happened in the Kurdish region during the former regime will open further wounds and should be left to historians.
However, a proper and thorough investigation of the atrocities may be needed in order to prevent any recurrence and to deny impunity to those that carried them out.
In the case of Halabja, it is vitally important to determine not only who the real perpetrators of the massacres were, but also who supplied them with the weapons to carry them out.

Analysis & views from the Middle East