يأخذ الكلام في العلاقات المصرية الايرانية عادة منحي مذهبيا‏,‏ اي في اطار اعادة انتاج خطاب الفتنة التاريخي بين السنة والشيعة‏,‏ وهو ما تجلي مؤخرا بشكل سافر في مناسبتين‏,‏ هما زيارة الرئيس الايراني محمود احمدي نجاد للقاهرة التي صاحبها الكثير من القيل والقال, ونص رسالة منشورة لعدد من المفكرين ورجال الدين الايرانيين معنونة للرئيس المصري محمد مرسي اثير ايضا حول مضمونها ودوافعها الكثير من الجدل الطائفي.
وبالرغم من صعوبة إنكار العامل المذهبي في صراعات المنطقة, سواء كونه حقيقة تاريخية, او عنصرا حاضرا في ازماتها الحالية, الا ان التركيز علي هذا الخطاب ومحاولة منحه الاولوية المطلقة علي العوامل الاقليمية المتفاعلة, يثير تساؤلات عديدة بشأن مبرراته وجدواه, وان كان الامر حقا يتعلق بنزاعات الهوية المتجذرة وقضايا التعايش, ام يتعداه الي مجمل وضع ومستقبل المنطقة في عالم ما بعد الثوارت العربية.
ما يثير المخاوف حقا هو عما اذا كان الخطاب المذهبي سيصب في مقولة الصراع داخل الاسلام الذي يتوقعه البعض كتحصيل حاصل للتغيرات الناتجة من صعود الاسلام السني وهيمنته علي المشهد السياسي وقواعد الحكم في بعض دول الربيع العربي, مقابل تزايد النفوذ الايراني والبزوغ الشيعي في المنطقة الذي تحقق بتميكن شيعة العراق من الدولة اثر الغزو الامريكي له.
ما أريد ان اشير اليه بشكل اكثر وضوحا هنا هو العلاقة الوثيقة بين الصراع الطائفي واحتمال تصاعده ومستقبل الثورات العربية وكيف ان العزف علي الاوتار الطائفية وتأجيج الفتنة السنية الشيعية سيؤدي بالنتيجة الي ضعضعة العملية التاريخية الجارية في عموم المنطقة لتحقيق اهداف الثورات وعلي رأسها وضع اسس الديمقراطية وبناء مجتمعات ودول حديثة متطورة علي انقاض انظمة الاستبداد والاستغلال والتخلف.
من هذا المنظور فان الصراع الحقيقي الجاري في المنطقة الان هو ليس بين اتباع مذهبين في دين واحد ويعبدون إلها واحدا وداخل شعوب تمتلك هوية وطنية وقومية جامعة, كما قد تظهره التشنجات والجعجعات والتطرفات المذهبية, بل هو في الحقيقة بين قوي المستقبل التي تريد ان تبني تلك المجتمعات علي اسس الحرية والعدالة والتقدم, وتلك القوي التي تريد ان تشدنا بعيدا الي وراء, وهي قوي موجودة داخل كل مذهب ودين تتضافر لاعقلانيتها وارتداديتها مع ما تحمله داخلها من اوهام الهوية لكي تنتج ذلك الشحن العدواني تجاه الاخر وللحداثة والديمقراطية.
ويظهر التاريخ الاسلامي عبر قرون طويلة ان قوي الغلو والانغلاق ومحترفي الفتنة المتحالفين مع التسلط والاستبداد بالذات هم الذين أججوا الصراعات واعتاشوا عليها لكي يحولوا الدين الحنيف من رسالة سمحاء قائمة علي اساس العدل الالهي والاحسان وتكريم الانسان واحترام حريته الي ملك عضوض قائم علي بيعة مشتراة, او نيابة ولائية مطلقة لا اساس لها في العقيدة.بل ولعل التاريخ يكتشف اكثر من ذلك وهو ان هلاك الكيانات الاسلامية وخراب العمران لم يأت من التنوع وحتي من الاختلاف المذهبي والعقدي, وانما من فساد الملك وجدب العقل عند اهل الرأي والاستشارة.
بايجاز فإن القضية المطروحة علينا الان كشعوب في هذه المنطقة ليست مواجهة سنية- شيعية بالمعني الفكري والاعتقادي, فذلك اصبح مكانه رفوف الكتب, بل هو صراع سياسي, ان لم يكن مقبولا فهو مفهوم, بين دول وكيانات علي المصالح والثروات والنفوذ والقوة, وهذا ما اثبتته التجربة العراقية وتبرهن عليه التجربة السورية وما يحيط بهما من استقطابات وتحيزات.واذا كان مطلوبا بقوة ايقاف تداعيات هلال الازمة الطائفية المآساوية تلك فمن الاجدر والاولي وقف اتساعه وتوظيفه باستدعاء اطراف ودول اخري في المنطقة وتعميمه لمنع ليس فقط المزيد من تشظي المنطقة وتقسيمها, بل الانهيار النهائي لها ككيان عربي- اسلامي.
ليس لدي أدلة قوية تدعم ما يقوله الرواة من ان هناك مؤامرة خارجية تحاول ان تستغل ثورات الربيع العربي بهدف تأجيج صراع سني- شيعي وتفتيت المنطقة من اجل بقاء اسرائيل وخدمة مصالح الغرب, ولكني مثل غيري لدينا ما يكفي من الحدس وسعة الافق والخبرة بان نري ان هناك تمثلات وممارسات تتيح امكانية الاقتناع بتلك النبوءات الكارثية.ما يمكننا رؤيته ببصيرة هو ان البعض منا قد يعمل, حتي دون قصد ولكن بحمية حاملي مشعل الدفاع عن الهوية, علي تقديم يد العون لمن يعملون علي ذلك السيناريو البغيض.
العلاقات العربية الايرانية بمجملها قضية اشكالية في تاريخ المنطقة المشترك بين الامتين اساسها هو وجود نسختين متعارضتين لديهما من هذا التاريخ.في العصر الحديث ضاعت فرص كثيرة لترميم هذه العلاقة واعادة بنائها علي اسس عقلانية ترتبط بمفاهيم الدولة الحديثة والعلاقات الدولية البناءة وحسن الجوار والشراكة في الاقليم او لم تأت بالنتائج المرجوة.
المرحلة القادمة التي ستختلط وتتشابك خلالها عوامل كثيرة في تلك العلاقات ستكون ضبابية وخاصة لحين حسم مستقبل الحكم وهويته لدي كل طرف. وحتي ذلك الحين سيكون ضروريا مواجهة تحدي العلاقات مع ايران بتفادي اطلاق العنان للوساوس والهذيان الطائفي, بمناسبة او بدونها, والاستعانة بدلا عن ذلك بآليات الحوار والمنابر الدبلوماسية المتوافرة وبالحفاظ علي المصالح المشتركة كجيران في اقليم واحد.

The Iraqi surge revisited

The surge remains America’s most famous and misleading myth in Iraq, writes Salah Nasrawi

Nearly 10 years after the US-led war on Iraq, debate has been renewed about the so-called “surge”, the tactical US military build-up designed to tackle the country’s anti-occupation insurgency and cut US losses from a fight that its troops were losing.
What was advocated by the Bush administration as one of the invasion’s strategic master strokes is increasingly being shown as nothing but another strategic blunder in the disastrous war the United States waged on Iraq in 2003.
The current partisan row in the US Congress over the endorsement of President Barack Obama’s choice for Pentagon chief Chuck Hagel, who opposed the surge while serving as a US senator, has also resonated in Iraq, which is embroiled in one of its worst political crises since the US withdrawal in December 2011.
On Monday, a suicide bomber detonated his explosives belt among a group of Sahwas north of Baghdad, killing at least 22 of the tribal militiamen and wounding dozens amid mounting sectarian tensions and pressures from Al-Qaeda on Iraq’s Sunnis to resume their insurgency against the country’s Shia led-government.
It was the latest attack in recent weeks against the Sahwas, also known as the “Sons of Iraq”, who were set up as part of the surge forged by US General David Petraeus, the US top commander in Iraq at the time, as part of a counter-insurgency strategy to defeat Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Desperate to reverse American failures to end the Sunni insurgency in the country, former US president George Bush decided in 2007 to tackle the Iraqi insurgents by ordering a surge of US troops in the country.
The plans were met by opposition by many in Congress who were pressing the administration to begin to pull US troops out of Iraq.
The policy had two declared main goals. First, to bring the level of violence down by increasing US force levels in areas designated as hot spots and forging a tactical alliance with cooperative Sunni groups while shifting to a counter-insurgency strategy to fight Al-Qaeda and other insurgency groups.
The second goal was to promote reconciliation among the competing sectarian and ethnic groups in Iraq.
Shortly after taking command of the US troops in Iraq in February 2007, Petraeus declared that the switch to a counter-insurgency strategy was working, and by autumn 2007 US army commanders and administration officials were boasting that sectarian violence in Iraq had plummeted to levels not seen since the 2003 war, with falling military and civilian casualties.
Their evaluation was that the plans were giving Iraq a chance to climb out of civil war and were creating the time to allow Iraqis to work toward a national political accommodation.
That highly positive assessment gave the Bush administration a chance to redeem itself for the defeat it had suffered in Iraq and clear the way for a US exit from the country.
However, sceptics blasted the assessment as nothing more than an article of faith and another “mission accomplished” declaration, noting that neither goal had been achieved.
Many warned that the consequences of the failure would be catastrophic and would hinder rebuilding Iraq as a viable state, making such an outcome unlikely.
Part of the argument in the current discussions about the Iraqi surge in Washington’s political and media arena is that history has not yet said its final word about the achievements of the strategy.
Indeed, history has long judged the surge, like the war on Iraq itself, as not only the biggest misstep in American military history, but also as a political and strategic fiasco.
Since the beginning, this writer has argued in this paper that the policy was failing. In June 2007, only a few months after the plan was operational, I argued that Washington’s surge strategy seemed to be crumbling based on a careful assessment of all its aspects.
In December, as much of the US media were hailing Petraeus as a hero and as the “man of the year” for bringing victory in Iraq, I again wrote that Iraq was far from being the tranquil democracy that the United States had promised on launching its war, and that it was still wracked by sectarian killing, a stagnant government and deadlocked national reconciliation.
Barely a year after the last US soldier pulled out of Iraq, the nation today continues to see regular outbreaks of sectarian violence and almost daily terrorist attacks, including a wave of bombings this week that killed dozens of people, including Sahwas members.
Violence last year rose to levels not seen for more than two years, with the toll in the deaths of civilians due to the political violence reaching 4,471, according to Iraq Body Count, a monitoring group, or slightly more than the year before.
Iraqi Sunni insurgents are back at work, and they are targeting Iraqi Shias and people connected to the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki. Al-Qaeda has stepped up its campaign against the Shias, and last week it urged all Sunnis to take up arms, leading to fears of civil war.
The Sahwas, controlling tens of thousands of fighters when they were part of the surge, crumbled after the government stopped paying their salaries and integrating them into the security forces.
Hundreds of the militiamen, many of them former insurgents, have been killed by Al-Qaeda, which considers them to be collaborators with the Americans and the Shia-led government.
A recent wave of rallies across the mainly Sunni areas to the north and west of Baghdad, including strikes and sit-ins, has sharpened the sectarian tensions. The Sunni protests were triggered by the arrest of the bodyguards of Sunni Finance Minister Rafei Al-Eissawi on 21 December on charges of terrorism and targeting Shias.
The protests raised speculation about the future of the violence-torn nation amid the worst political deadlock and sectarian divisions seen since the US troops departed.
The seven-week demonstrations seem to be a sign of regained Sunni confidence in the face of Shia domination since the US-led invasion that toppled the Sunni regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in 2003.
Iraq has remained gripped in its worst political crisis as the leaders of its divided sectarian and ethnic communities have failed to reach agreement on how to share power and government revenues.
The country’s Sunni and Kurdish leaders have accused Al-Maliki of violating the terms of a power-sharing deal he signed with rival political parties following inconclusive parliamentary elections in 2010.
As the political crisis in Iraq deepens, Baghdad has been embroiled in a long-running dispute over political participation, oil and land and revenue-sharing with the Kurds in the north.
Tensions between the central Iraqi government in Baghdad and the Kurdish region intensified following reports of a military stand-off between Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers and the Iraqi army.
As the Sunni protests continue and the violence escalates a year after the last US troops pulled out from Iraq, the beleaguered country has slipped into a state of ongoing and escalating political turmoil.
Corruption in Iraq is not only widespread and endemic, but also systematic and institutionalised.  Most of Iraq’s political leaders are believed to be involved in one type or another of corruption, kickbacks or embezzlement.
Some face corruption charges, including theft or mishandling of state property, nepotism and extortion.
If the objective of the surge was to build a stable and democratic Iraq before the US troop withdrawal, then all these and other mishaps are living testimonies of the stark US defeat in Iraq.
It is sad, disappointing and shameful that some US congressmen, as the handling of Hagel’s confirmation hearing has shown, have been engaged in political game-playing while ignoring Iraq’s ongoing tragedy that was caused by the US occupation.

Towards an Iraqi Spring?

Can Iraq’s Sunnis fulfil their goals without taking up arms against the country’s Shia-led government, asks Salah Nasrawi

For some six weeks, Iraqi Sunnis have kept their anti-government protests peaceful by trying to air their grievances and press their demands while distancing themselves from violent insurgency groups such as former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s diehard loyalists and the Al-Qaeda terror organisation.
While they have risen up against what they consider to be their marginalisation by the country’s Shia-led government, the Sunnis have also reached out to disgruntled Iraqi Shias and dubbed their protests the “Iraqi Spring” in emulation of the 2011 Arab Spring that toppled autocratic and corrupt regimes in three Arab countries.
However, the clashes this weekend between protesters and army troops in which several people were killed, including two soldiers, have shaken the country and sparked concerns that the peaceful rallies could turn violent.
Worse, the showdown in the town of Falluja in the Sunni heartland of western Iraq, which has boasted of the use of force to fight government troops, has raised the alarm that Iraq could descend to the bloodbaths of the sectarian war that spiked in 2006 and 2007.
The details are conflicting about the confrontation in Falluja. Government officials said protesters had tried to cross an army checkpoint on the outskirts of the town and had thrown rocks at soldiers, who opened fire in response.
 Representatives of the protesters said the firing had been unwarranted. Later, two soldiers were shot dead at another of the town’s checkpoints, in apparent retaliation for Friday’s clashes.
The Falluja protest was one of several across Sunni-majority areas of Iraq that have raged in recent weeks, hardening the opposition to the Shia-led government of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki amid political turmoil and a deterioration in security following the US withdrawal in December 2011, nine years after the beginning of its occupation.
The unrest erupted after security forces arrested members of Sunni minister of finance Rafia Al-Essawi’s security staff in December on charges of terrorism. The crackdown has enflamed Iraq’s lingering political tensions, which have been heightened since an arrest warrant was issued against Sunni vice-president Tarek Al-Hashimi, one of Al-Essawi’s political allies, in December 2011.
Al-Hashimi was accused of leading death squads and was later sentenced to multiple death sentences.
The protesters also claimed that thousands of fellow Sunnis, including women, were in prison accused of terrorism, some without being charged. They alleged that female inmates had been abused and even raped by prison or police officials, a charge denied by the government.
The protesters accused the government of sidestepping the Sunni minority in the country, which has been politically dominated by the Shia majority since the overthrow of Saddam’s Sunni regime. They also complained of poor government services and a lack of economic progress in Sunni areas.
Initially, the protesters denounced the crackdown on the Sunnis and then demanded the ending of what they described as their marginalisation and discriminatory measures against them, such as the de-Baathification law which bans senior members of the former Saddam regime from government employment.
They have also demanded modifications to the anti-terrorism laws and an amnesty for Sunni prisoners convicted on terrorism charges.
Al-Maliki has agreed to meet the Sunni protesters half-way and has promised to release some prisoners, but he has remained non-committal about the protesters’ demands to abolish the de-Baathification and anti-terrorism measures.
“If we did that, it would mean that the [former ruling] Baath Party would make a comeback, and we would find ourselves again in prison,” he told Al-Baghdadiya television on Sunday.
In return, the Sunnis have hardened their positions and called on Al-Maliki to resign. They also want to abolish the political process forged by the US occupation authority, which they believe has empowered the Shias at their expense.
In the face of the army intervention in Falluja, Sunni tribal leaders threatened to launch attacks against the army in the western province of Anbar, which has been the centre of the protests.
The leaders said they had given the government one week to arrest the soldiers responsible for opening fire on the crowd. On Sunday, eight missiles were fired on a military camp in the province.
The threats to resort to arms, whether real or rhetorical, have raised serious questions about what options the protesters have if the Shia-led government remains unwilling to make compromises on their key demands.
This is the nub of the issues that the Sunnis will have to address as they insist on embracing and defending their stated goals.
Many Sunnis resorted to arms after the overthrow of Saddam, only to abandon the insurgency later and become actively involved in the political process, raising hopes that the Sunnis would finally join in rebuilding the country following the US withdrawal.
Only Al-Qaeda and a few other small groups said they would fight on to topple the Shia-led government.
Many observers believe that a large-scale insurgency now is not a viable strategy for Sunnis to achieve their goals of ending marginalisation and discrimination.
Genuinely standing up to the Shia-led government and its army militarily would require more than bombings and clashes with the security forces, since these may inflict deaths and destruction but they are unlikely to achieve political objectives and could draw sectarian reprisals.
Most Sunnis live in Baghdad and other ethnically mixed provinces where they are outnumbered by Shias. Sectarian strife could trigger ethnic cleansing that could drive them out of the capital to Sunni pockets in the provinces in a strategic muddle not guided by any clearly calculated long-term vision.
Also, if the government pulls out the army and federal police force from Sunni areas in response to the threats, Al-Qaeda and other hardline groups will return and gain control of them.
Since the start of the protests in late December Al-Qaeda has mounted a violent campaign against Iraqi military barracks, checkpoints, and security forces in Baghdad, Diyala, and Anbar provinces.
The attacks have reinforced the government’s claim that the protests have been infiltrated by extremists such as Al-Qaeda and members of Saddam’s Baath Party, who have been trying to steer them away from peaceful demonstrations and use Sunni areas to launch terrorist attacks against the government and security forces.
If anything has been demonstrated by the protests, it is that sectarianism and inter-ethnic conflicts have been major forces shaping Iraq and the structure and stability of the state since the US withdrawal.
Ten years after the US-led invasion of the country, the process had wound up almost exactly where it started — an Iraq embodied in a US-engineered structure, a divided nation, and a failed state.
Iraqi Sunni Arabs are strongly opposed to the federal system forged by the US occupation, which strengthened the hands of the Shias in the south and the Kurds in the north at their expense.
The Sunnis, who maintained political power in modern Iraq until the overthrow of the Saddam regime, may never feel truly part of the nation without the crucial first step of reintegrating them on a more equitable basis.
On the other hand, it is impossible to conceive of any sustainable outcome in Iraq without a political agreement based on recognising the Shias as the majority wielding power appropriate to their numbers and addressing their past misgivings and fears of marginalisation and accommodating Kurdish aspirations to self-rule.
Through their mass protests, Iraqi Sunnis have made their voices heard, but they now have to find an appropriate strategy to lure the Shias into broaching a new deal, one that begins moving in the direction of reforming the political process towards one based on citizenship and democracy and not sectarian power-sharing.

Change of landscape in Iraq?

Iraqi Sunni protesters have rejected concessions offered by the country’s Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki and are pushing hard to change the political landscape, writes Salah Nasrawi

Angered by Iraq’s Shia-led government’s procrastination in ending what they consider to be their marginalisation and the exclusion of their sect, the country’s minority Sunnis have stepped up their resistance and after protests lasting several weeks are seeking to topple the US-engineered political process that they believe has empowered the majority Shias at their expense.
The Sunni protests erupted in late December after government forces arrested security staff of the country’s Sunni finance minister on terrorism charges. The protesters first denounced the crackdown on Sunnis and then demanded better treatment for Sunni inmates in government prisons.
They also complained of poor government services and a lack of economic development in Sunni areas.
Sunni demonstrators later came up with a host of demands, largely centring on ending exclusionary measures against them, such as the de-Baathification law which bans senior members of the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein from government employment.
They also demanded modifications to the anti-terrorism laws and an amnesty for Sunni prisoners convicted on terrorism charges.
Sunni Arabs maintained political power in Iraq after the modern state came into being in the 1920s following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, marginalising Shia Arabs and Kurds.
Saddam’s Baath Party, most of whose members were Sunnis, ruled a single-party state for 35 years until it was overthrown by the 2003 US-led invasion. A federal system forged by the US occupation then strengthened the hands of the Shias in the south and the Kurds in the north, minimising the Sunnis’ overall influence.
A Sunni insurgency against US occupation troops turned sour after it was hijacked by Saddam loyalists and the Al-Qaeda terror group, pitching them against the country’s Shia-led security forces.
Over the past 10 years, the rebellion has pushed Iraq close to a bloody sectarian war many times following orchestrated bombing attacks on Shias.
Now the country’s Sunnis hope that through the protests and sit-ins that have swept across Sunni provinces and Baghdad’s Sunni neighbourhoods they can abolish the political structure forged by the US occupation authority, allowing them to negotiate a more equitable governing system.
Six weeks after the protests erupted, the demonstrators have hardened their positions, and they are now demanding an overhaul of the political process, including drafting a new constitution and abolishing laws which they say were enacted to sidestep them. 
They have also called on incumbent Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki to step down in order to clear the way for new elections and the restructuring of the government, the army and security forces to include more Sunnis.
On Friday, many protesters in Anbar, Mosul, Samarra and other Sunni areas shouted cries of “leave, leave” and “the people want to overthrow the regime,” a central chant of the 2011 Arab Spring that toppled three Arab dictators.
Many protesters also blasted what they called neighbouring Iran’s growing influence in Iraq and its support for Shia political groups. 
Al-Maliki’s initial response to the protests was defiance and arrogance, calling the demonstrators “a bubble” and scoffing at their slogans as “rotten”. He also accused them of harbouring foreign agendas and threatened to arrest the protesters if they tried to close down government offices.
But as the protests escalated and their demands snowballed, Al-Maliki named a committee to address the protesters’ demands, and ordered the release of hundreds of Sunni detainees in an effort to appease the rallies.
He also promised to consider an amnesty for prisoners if they were pardoned by the victims or their families.
The Shia Iraqi National Coalition that forms the backbone of Al-Maliki’s government invited Sunni and Kurdish politicians for talks in a bid to resolve the dispute that has already paralysed parliament and the cabinet. 
The Sunni protests show no sign of abating, and leaders insist they will not abandon their gatherings until all their demands are met. The protesters are seemingly receiving support from political and religious leaders who have been taking a back seat in the confrontations, allowing the protesters to make their voices heard.  
On Sunday, Sunni deputy prime minister and a top leader of the Sunni Al-Iraqiya bloc, Saleh Al-Mutlek, said that Sunni politicians would not meet again with their Shia counterparts if the government did not meet the protesters’ demands.
In further signs of the protesters gaining clout, the prominent Sunni cleric Abdel-Malik Al-Saadi turned down requests from government officials for a meeting to ask for his help in calming the protesters.
Instead, he told them to go to see the protests’ leaders and listen to their demands.
The protesters have also received backing from Kurdish regional President Massoud Barzani, who described the demonstrators’ demands as “legitimate”.
“The federal government… has increased the crisis through neglect and threats that have led to dangerous consequences,” he said in a statement issued late on Saturday.
Barzani, who has accused Al-Maliki of being a dictator, attempted last year to convince parliament to withdraw confidence in the prime minister but could not master enough votes.
Al-Maliki has also been facing challenges from inside his own camp over the way he has been handling the dispute with the Sunnis, and former vice president Adel Abdel-Mahdi criticised the way prisons in Iraq were run by the government.
“Obviously, thousands of Iraqis are subject to injustice,” he wrote in a syndicated article this week.
Mounir Haddad, a Shia judge in Iraq’s Special Criminal Court, accused prison officials of committing crimes against humanity. “Arab Sunnis are subject to injustice worse than that suffered by Shias under Saddam,” Haddad told the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper on Sunday.
“Torture, abuse and murder by torture are common,” he said.
The Sunni protests are certainly not making life easier for Al-Maliki, but it is unclear if they can topple the Shia prime minister who has been able to outmanoeuvre his enemies with political monopoly and brinkmanship.
In addition, Iran, which considers Al-Maliki to be one of its staunchest allies in Iraq, has already stepped in and made it clear that he can depend on its full support.
“The Iraqi government is strong… and has reached power through the ballot box,” Ali Akbar Velayati, adviser to the Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, told a Lebanese television station on Saturday.
“We know enemies of the Iraqi people will not stand idle, but the Iraqi government is quite capable of dealing with these enemies,” he said.
Al-Maliki is also using government resources to mobilise public support. Last week, a few hundred of his supporters who were reportedly brought in by government buses, held rallies across Iraq demanding that the government not give in to the Sunnis’ demands.
In Baghdad, demonstrators carrying the prime minister’s picture decorated with slogans hailing him as a Shia hero, demanded that Al-Maliki be elected to a third term.
Al-Maliki is also benefiting from Sunni divisions. While moderate Sunnis want to work with the prime minister to improve power-sharing agreements, hardliners are calling for escalation, including a civil-disobedience campaign that would feature strikes and the boycott of the government in Sunni provinces.
Two tribal leaders believed to support a peaceful resolution of the crisis were killed last week. On Sunday, Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the assassination of Ifan Al-Essawi, a moderate Sunni lawmaker believed to be mediating between the protesters and the government.
The group said in a statement that its fighters had killed Al-Essawi because he was a “dog of the Americans” and a “tail of the Shias”.
Such murders and intimidation by Al-Qaeda will certainly raise concerns among moderate Sunnis that breaking with the central government will embolden the terror group at their expense.
It is not clear, however, if Iraqi Sunnis will be able to topple Al-Maliki or drastically change what they perceive as the country’s unequal political structure.
However, one lesson they can extract from the protests is that they have been able to give themselves a leg up and make their voices heard.

                                  
                       الربيع العربي بين اليأس والأمل

خلال الايام القليلة القادمة سيقف الكثيرون من العرب لكي يتأمل كل منهم في ذاته في ذكري الوثبات التي انطلقت قبل عامين في بعض بلدانهم والتي تمكنت من الاطاحة ببعض اعتي انظمة الاستبداد والقهر والفساد التي تربعت فوق دست السلطة فيها لعقود طويلة.سيكون هناك بالتأكيد تقييمات متفاوتة بين من يري في الثورات ربيعا اشرق علي العرب بعد طول سبات وبين من لن يراها الا علي هواه من مرتابين ومشككين وموتورين وذوي رؤي قاصرة.

كشخص عاش في ظل تلك الانظمة وحلم بهذه الثورات مبكرا, وعاصر بعضا منها في بلدانها, منذ ان بدأت ارهاصاتها الاولي, بل أسهم بقدر ما يستطيع في التحريض عليها, فأني أعرف تماما مشاعر القلق والحيرة, وربما ايضا خيبات الرجاء, التي تنتاب الناس بسبب ما يرونه من المسارات المتعرجة التي مشت فيها الثورات العربية, وايضا مخاوفهم من ان موسم حصاد ثمارها قد طال انتظاره.  لست منزعجا من حالة القنوط والاحباط ومن فقدان الصبر الذي اجده لدي الكثيرين وهم يعبرون عن فداحة خيبة املهم بالثورات نتيجة لما يرونه من مآلات الامور, ابتداء من سوء الاوضاع الاقتصادية, وتدهور الامن وتعثر الثورات, بل سرقتها, او انهيارات في اسس الدولة والمجتمع, فتلك كلها أعراض جانبية عرفتها الثورات العالمية.غير ان ما يضايقني فعلا هو تلك التحليلات التي تقطع بان طريق الثورة لم يعد سالكا وان الاستثناء العربي لايزال هو القاعدة التي لا فكاك منها.
لا أحد بالسذاجة التي يمكن أن يبرر بها الانتكاسات التي تواجهها الثورات العربية, وخاصة التهديدات والمخاطر بانحراف مساراتها الي نقيضها, فتلك شواهد عيانية ماثلة في حياتنا, ولكن ليس بامكان احد كذلك ان يبخس منجزاتها وخاصة تحطيم جدران الخوف والتردد واللامبالاة, والكشف عن أثمن ما كان مخبوءا في دواخلنا كبشر من معادن, وهو رفض التسلط والتهميش وامتهان الكرامة والتشبث بقيم المساواة والحرية والعدالة.
ما أريد قوله هنا هو أن التقليل من قيمة المكاسب المتحققة من الثورات امر غير ممكن فهي ولدت سلوكيات وعقليات مختلفة تماما عما ساد خلال عقود الدكتاتورية واصبح للناس ارادة حرة, يدركون من خلالها ان ما كان مستحيلا امسي الان ممكنا, كما اصبحوا يعون حقوقهم ويعرفون كيف يحرسونها, وبالاقل فانهم يعرفون الان ان الطغاة الذين يحتمل ظهورهم في السياق الجديد سيدركون فداحة الثمن الذي يتعين عليهم دفعه فيما لو حاولوا اعادتهم الي القن من جديد.
كذلك, لاغرابة في اننا نعاني من مصاعب جمة نستطيع ان نحصي الكثير منها, لكن ادراك جملة اسبابها سيساعدنا حتما علي فهم المرحلة وتجاوزها.هناك اولا الارث المهول لمراحل الاستبداد والخراب الذي عشناه, والذي يصعب ان نزيله بين ليلة وضحاها,وهناك ايضا مشاكل المرحلة الانتقالية واخطاؤها, كما ان هناك بالتأكيد من يحاول استثمار منطقة الفراغ للاستحواذ علي السلطة وتسخيرها لاهداف مبتسرة, دون ان يمتلك الحد الادني من برنامج التوافق الوطني الذي يحقق احلام اي ثورة, والمشروع الحداثي الذي تمثله قيمها النبيلة.بالاضافة الي ذلك فإن هناك قوي اقليمية ودولية متضررة توفر عقاقيرها السامة وتحاول التلاعب والضغط لحرف الثورات عن مساراتها واغراقها بالدسائس في وحول الفوضي والصراعات.
من هنا فان توجيه سهام النقد الي الثورة ذاتها لما آلت اليه الاوضاع في بلدانها يبدو بعيدا عن الانصاف, أو تقييما ساذجا وسخيفا, ان لم يكن أمرا ينطوي علي سوء نية, فالاحري ان نتمعن كثيرا في مظاهر التجربة ذاتها وان نوجه ذلك النقد للقوي السياسية والنخب الفكرية التي لايبعث اداؤها علي الحسد لعجزها عن الارتقاء الي مستوي المهمة التي اوكلت لها, او اوكلتها الي نفسها, في قيادة عملية التغيير وتسخير العقول والطاقات لتحقيق اهداف الثورة, وانشغلت عوض ذلك في صراعات وصفقات متوحشة من اجل الحصول علي النصيب الاوفر من الكعكة الثورية.
اننا في الحقيقة امام مجموعات من القوي تتحمل النصيب الاكبر من وزر الحالة المستعصية بغض النظر عن موقعها من الثورة, بعضها دوغمائي سلاحه كومة من عظات جذابة لكنها طوباوية او غير واقعية, بل حتي مضللة, وبعضها الاخر حالم ومشتت ينتظر ان يصعد علي اعتاب الفشل الذي سيصيب التجربة, وبطبيعة الحال هناك جزء اخر هي القوي المعادية للثورة في الداخل والخارج التي أخذت ترتدي ثياب الحملان.هؤلاء هم من يقف اليوم امام تأسيس مشروع الثورات العربية وتأمين وجودها وتحويل حلم الحرية والعدالة والعيش الكريم الي واقع.
اعود لاقول ونحن نقف جميعا لنستذكر تلك الايام الخالدة للثورات في تونس ومصر واليمن وليبيا وسوريا إنه ليس هناك بالتأكيد عصا سحرية, لتحطيم القوقعة التي عشنا فيها زمنا طويلا ولا لازالة الحواجز الشاخصة في طريق الثورات, كما ان من التفاؤل المفرط الاعتقاد بامكان ان تتحقق جميع اهدافها بين ليل وضحاه.لكنا بالاقل بتنا اكثر ايمانا بان العجلة لن تدور الي وراء, وهو ما سنبقي بحاجة اليه لتذكير اولئك المتهافتين علي وراثة السلطة بان الثورة ليست مجرد تغيير للنظام, او حتي بديل افضل, بل هي صراع وجودي من أجل واقع مغاير تماما يجد الانسان فيه حريته وكرامته وسعادته وعيشه الرغيد.
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